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The postwar experience of many societies in Africa, Central and South America and else-
where has been marred by severe crises and substantial volatility. Why some societies
suﬀer from large volatility and crises is one of the central questions facing macroeco-
nomics. The Washington consensus highlighted a variety of factors as primary causes
of bad macroeconomic performance and volatility, including poorly enforced property
rights and corruption, but the emphasis was often placed on mismanaged macroeconomic
policies.1 Policies often blamed for crises and poor macroeconomic performance include
excessive government spending, high inﬂation, and overvalued exchange rates. Similarly,
in most macroeconomic accounts of economic and ﬁnancial crises, the blame is often laid
on distortionary macroeconomic policies. A salient example would be the recent crisis
in Argentina, where, according to many macroeconomists, an overvalued exchange rate
was the cause of the macroeconomic problems. Another example is chronic volatility
in Ghana, especially from independence until the early 1980s. Ghana had a relatively
high inﬂation (1970-98 average=39.1 percent) and one of the most overvalued exchange
rates in our sample. It also experienced substantial crises and volatility (the standard
deviation of the annual growth rate, 1970-97, was approximately 5, as compared to, for
example, an average of 2.5 among West European countries). In Ghana, as in Argentina,
it is easy to blame macroeconomic policies for macroeconomic problems.
Distortionary macroeconomic policies are not typically chosen because politicians
believe that high inﬂation or overvalued exchange rates are good for economic perfor-
mance. Instead, they reﬂect underlying institutional problems in these countries. For
example, in his classic account of political economy in Africa, Robert Bates (1981) em-
phasized how overvalued exchange rates were in eﬀect a way of transferring resources
1See for example Williamson (1990). This is also the line generally taken by the IMF and the
World Bank. For example, Edwards (1989) analyzes the 34 IMF programs with high-conditionality
between 1983 and 1985, and provides a breakdown of the conditions/policy requirements. Four of the
ﬁve most common conditions required by the IMF are: control of credit to public sector, control of
money aggregates, devaluation and control of public expenditures.
1from the large agricultural sector to urban interests, and developed the argument that
this reﬂected the power of urban interests to inﬂuence the decisions of politicians in
an “institutionally-weak” society. In fact, Ghana is a textbook case of highly distor-
tionary redistribution, political instability, and politician after politician being captured
by interest groups or pursuing distortionary policies in order to remain in power.
This perspective raises the possibility that the macroeconomic performance of many
of these societies may reﬂect not only, or not even primarily, the eﬀect of distortionary
macroeconomic policies, but the deep institutional causes leading to these particular
macroeconomic policies. In other words, one may suspect that in the Ghanaian example,
even without the overvalued exchange rate, macroeconomic performance would have
been volatile because with the institutions and the social structure Ghana inherited from
the British colonists, there was no way of constraining politicians, ensuring adequate
enforcement of contracts and property rights, and preventing various social groups from
engaging in chronic political ﬁghts to take control of the society’s resources. Through
one channel or another, the major producers in Ghana, the cocoa farmers, were going
to be expropriated by the politicians and urban interests. Overvalued exchange rates
were simply one of the ways of expropriating the producers. Moreover, given the weak
constraints on politicians and political elites, there were substantial gains to be had from
political power, and these gains created considerable political and economic instability
in Ghana, as diﬀerent groups fought to achieve and retain power.
The main result of this paper is to document a strong and robust relationship between
the historically-determined component of postwar institutions and volatility (as well as
severity of economic crises and economic growth): countries that inherited worse (“ex-
tractive”) institutions from European colonial powers are much more likely to experience
high volatility and severe economic crises.
To document this relationship, we build on our previous work, Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2001), and develop an instrument for the historically-determined
component of institutions in a cross-section of countries. More speciﬁcally, we exploit
2diﬀerences in mortality rates faced by European settlers during colonial times as a source
of variation in the historical development of institutions among former colonies. Former
European colonies provide an attractive sample to study the eﬀect of institutions on
economic outcomes; European colonization of a large part of the globe starting in the
15th century comes close to a “natural experiment” in creating diﬀerent institutions,
since the institutions in these countries wer el a r g e l ys h a p e db yE u r o p e a nc o l o n i z a t i o n ,
and there were systematic diﬀerences in institutions that Europeans set up in various
colonies. In places where colonists faced high mortality rates, they followed a diﬀerent
colonization strategy, with more extractive institutions, while they were more likely to
set up institutions protecting private property and encouraging investments in areas
where they settled. In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), we illustrated and
developed the argument that (potential) European settler mortality rates are a good in-
strument for the institutional development of these countries throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and via this channel, for their current institutions. We also
showed a large eﬀect of institutions on long-run economic development.
Figure 1 shows that there is also a strong relationship between settler mortality rates
and postwar economic outcomes, especially volatility and crises. Former colonies with
higher European mortality more than 100 years ago are today more likely to suﬀer high
volatility (as measured by the standard deviation of growth rate), severe output collapses
(as measured by the largest output drop in any year) and low growth. Our interpretation
is that these relationships reﬂect the causal eﬀect of institutions on volatility and other
economic outcomes: in places where the Europeans did not settle, they set up more
extractive institutions with power concentrated in the hands of a small elite, and these
countries typically ended up with weaker (worse) institutions at the beginning of the
postwar era. And institutionally-weak societies not only grow less slowly in the long run
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002a), but also experience greater volatility
and other worse macroeconomic outcomes.
The relationships shown in Figure 1, especially those involving volatility and crises,
3are highly robust and account for a large fraction of diﬀerences in these economic out-
comes across countries.2 Moreover, once we control for the eﬀect of institutions on
economic outcomes in this manner, standard macroeconomic variables, often blamed for
economic crises and volatility, play a relatively minor role. This suggests that macro-
economic policies are not the major cause of crises, and are more likely symptoms of
underlying institutional problems. Somewhat more surprisingly, these macroeconomic
variables, with the possible exception of exchange rate misalignment, do not appear to be
a major mediating channel through which institutions aﬀect economic outcomes. Weak
institutions appear to create macroeconomic problems via a variety of microeconomic
as well as macroeconomic channels.
What are the institutions that matter? In our empirical exercise, we use an insti-
tutional variable for which we have data for a broad cross-section of countries at the
beginning of the sample: constraints placed on the executive, as measured in the Polity
IV data set based on the work of Robert Gurr. This variable is conceptually attractive
since it measures institutional and other constraints that are placed on presidents and
dictators (or monarchies). Theoretically, we expect a society where elites and politicians
are eﬀectively constrained to experience less inﬁghting between various groups to take
control of the state, and to pursue more sustainable policies. Nevertheless, “constraint
on the executive” is only one measure of institutions, and it is quite possible that a
country might have adequate constraints on their executives, but suﬀer from corruption
or weak property rights for other reasons. More generally, the institutions we are in-
terested in are a cluster of social arrangements that include constitutional and social
limits on politicians’ and elites’ power, the rule of law, provisions for mediating social
cleavages, strong property rights enforcement, a minimum amount of equal opportunity
and relatively broad-based access to education, etc. This cluster determines whether
agents with the investment opportunities will undertake these investments, whether
there will be signiﬁcant swings in the political and social environment leading to crises,
2Figure 1A excludes two outliers, Gabon and Rwanda, to show the pattern more clearly. Including
these two countries slightly strengthens the relationship.
4and whether politicians will be induced to pursue unsustainable policies in order to re-
main in power in the face of deep social cleavages. Therefore, we prefer to be relatively
loose on what the fundamental institutional problems are, and instead try to isolate the
historically-determined component of these institutional diﬀerences.
How do we interpret these results? Our conclusion is that the large postwar cross-
country diﬀerences in volatility, crises and growth performance have institutional causes.
Both poor macroeconomic performance and distortionary macroeconomic policies are
symptoms rather than causes, and the macroeconomic policies often blamed for crises
do not appear to be the major mediating channel for the impact of institutions on eco-
nomic instability. This does not mean that macroeconomic policies do not matter for
macroeconomic outcomes. Clearly, overvalued exchange rates or high inﬂation would
discourage certain investments, and unsustainable policies will necessarily lead to some
sort of crisis.3 Our main argument is that in institutionally-weak societies, elites and
politicians will ﬁnd various ways of expropriating diﬀerent segments of the society, rang-
ing from microeconomic to various macroeconomic policies. It is the presence of this
type of expropriation and the power struggle to control the state to take advantage of
the resulting rents that underlie bad macroeconomic outcomes and volatility.4 A logical
implication of this view is as e e s a we ﬀect: if the elites are prevented from using one
particular instrument, as long as institutional weaknesses remain, a likely outcome is
3Moreover, the cause of the decline in U.S. output volatility over the past two decades is unlikely to
be institutional. Our focus here is not diﬀerences in output volatility between OECD countries, which
all have relatively good institutions, but the large cross-country diﬀerences in volatility across societies
with very diﬀerent institutional structures.
4There are a variety of reasons why weak constraints on executives and other institutional problems
might lead to volatility. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) show how “weak institutions”
might encourage coups and revolutions, leading to political and economic instability. Alternatively,
institutional failures may also make economic adjustment diﬃcult. In an important paper, Rodrik
(1999) suggests that countries with weak institutions are unable to deal with major economic shocks,
and identiﬁes the major shocks with those taking place during the 1970s. Rodrik suggests that this
inability to deal with global economic changes underlies the disappointing growth performance of many
less developed countries (LDCs) during the 1980s and 1990s (see also Easterly, 2001). Similarly, Johnson,
Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) show that among emerging markets open to capital ﬂows, it was
those with weaker political and ﬁnancial institutions that experienced more severe crises during the late
1990s, suggesting an important interaction between global shocks and institutions (see also Eichengreen
and Bordo 2002).
5that they will pursue their objectives using other instruments. And this, we believe, is
the reason why none of the standard macroeconomic variables are the main mediating
channel for the eﬀect of institutions on volatility and crises.
To improve our understanding of the relationship between institutions and volatility,
we also look at whether countries with weak institutions are unable to deal with global
crises, world economic slowdowns or other global developments, such as the increase in
the volume of international trade. Our results indicate that this is not an important
channel via which weak institutions aﬀect volatility and economic performance. We also
ﬁnd that there is a very similar relationship between institutions and volatility in every
decade, and crises are spread across the various decades quite evenly.
These ﬁndings suggest that it is the inability of institutionally-weak societies to deal
with their own economic and political shocks that is of ﬁrst-order importance. Moreover,
this inability appears to be somewhat linked to “state failures” (civil wars, revolutions or
periods of severe inﬁghting). If we consider these state failures as the tip of the iceberg,
it is a reasonable conjecture that many economic crises and a great deal of volatility
happen amidst political problems. At some level, this is not surprising. The problem of
institutionally-weak societies is to constrain those controlling political power, and this
lack of constraints on politicians and elites increases the willingness of various groups
to ﬁght in order to gain power, and enables them to exploit their position, sometimes
with disastrous consequences, when they come to power. Nevertheless, that the greater
instability faced by institutionally-weak societies is linked to frequent political crises is
for now only a conjecture, backed only with some circumstantial evidence.
There is now a large literature on economic volatility. Much of it focuses on developed
countries, and investigates why the business cycle has become less volatile in the U.S.
and many OECD economies over the past 20 years (e.g., Blanchard and Simon, 2001;
McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Stock and Watson, 2002). This literature emphasizes
technological factors (e.g., improved inventory management) and improvements in policy
(e.g., better and more credible monetary policy, inﬂation targeting etc.). Our results
6can be interpreted as showing that these factors are much less important in the very
large cross-country diﬀerences in volatility than are institutional diﬀerences.
The literature on macroeconomic volatility among LDCs is also large, but focuses
primarily on macroeconomic problems (e.g., Krugman, 1979, Dornbusch et al., 1995;
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and ﬁnancial factors (e.g., Caballero, 2001; Caballero
and Krishnamurthy, 2000; Chang and Valesco, 2002; Denizer et al., 2001; Easterly,
Islam and Stiglitz, 2000, Voth, 2002, Raddatz, 2002). We are unaware of any studies
linking volatility to long-run institutional causes other than the paper by Rodrik (2000)
which shows that democracies are less volatile than nondemocratic regimes. In addition,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show a strong relationship between initial income and
volatility: richer countries are less volatile. They interpret this as resulting from the fact
that richer countries are able to achieve a more balanced sectoral distribution of output.
Ramey and Ramey (1995) document a cross-country relationship between volatility and
growth, and interpret it as due to the adverse eﬀects of volatility on growth. Finally,
Kraay and Ventura (2000) develop a model where trade between rich and poor countries
can increase volatility in poor countries, and provide some evidence consistent with this
prediction.
In addition, our work relates to the large literature on the determinants of growth.
Starting with the seminal work by Barro (1991), many economists have found a variety
of important determinants of growth. While some of these determinants are outcomes of
previous investments, such as education, others are contemporary policy variables, such
as government consumption or inﬂation. Although economic growth is not our main
focus, our paper is clearly related to this literature since we are trying to determine
which of these macroeconomic policies matter for volatility and crises (and also for
growth), when we take the importance of institutions into account.
Finally, this paper is most closely related to studies investigating the relationship
between institutions and economic performance. Many economists and social scientists
have argued that economic and political institutions are a major determinant of economic
7outcomes. Recent proponents of this view include, among others, Jones (1981), North
and Thomas (1973), North (1981), and Olson (1981)–see also Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2002), Bardhan (1984), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996), Parente and Prescott (1999) and Tornell and Velasco (1992) for attempts to
model some of these issues. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 2002), Besley
(1995), Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2002), Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Mauro (1995), among others, provide
micro and macro evidence consistent with this notion. All of these studies focus on the
eﬀect of institutions on economic growth, investment or the level of development. The
current paper can be viewed as extending this literature by showing a robust and strong
eﬀect of institutions on the volatility of economic activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we document the
correlation between a range of macroeconomic variables and volatility, which is consistent
with the standard view that macroeconomic policies have a causal eﬀect on volatility.
In Section 3, we discuss why we expect a relationship between institutions and volatil-
ity, and present two case studies, Argentina and Ghana, where institutional weaknesses
appear to have translated into macroeconom i cp r o b l e m s .I nS e c t i o n4 ,w ee x p l a i no u r
empirical strategy for distinguishing the eﬀect of institutions on volatility, crises and
growth from the eﬀect of macroeconomic policies. In Section 5, we review the source of
variation in institutions that we will exploit for this exercise. In Section 6, we document
the relationship between institutions and macroeconomic performance, and show how
once we control for the causal eﬀect of institutions (or of the historically-determined com-
ponent of institutions) on volatility and economic performance, macroeconomic policies
do not appear to play a direct role. In Section 7, we investigate the robustness of the
eﬀect of institutions on volatility, crises and growth, and explore various mechanisms
via which this eﬀect might be working. Section 8 concludes.
82 Macroeconomic Policies and Economic Performance
The standard macroeconomic view links economic volatility to bad macroeconomic poli-
cies. According to this view, large government sectors and budget deﬁcits, high inﬂa-
tion, and misaligned exchange rates will result in macroeconomic crises. In line with
this standard view, many macroeconomists see a causal relationship between the im-
proved conduct of monetary policy of the past two decades and the increased stability
of U.S. output. Are there grounds to suspect that there is also a relationship between
cross-country diﬀerences in volatility and macroeconomic policies? Again, the standard
view among macroeconomists seems to be that the answer is yes. For example, in its
1987 Development Report, the World Bank states that “high inﬂation increases uncer-
tainty, discourages investment and technological change, distorts relative prices, and
stands in the way of sustainable growth.” In discussing crises in Mexico and Argentina,
Dornbusch et al. (1995, p. 220) write: “...the real exchange it is a key relative price.
When it becomes too high, it hurts growth, endangers ﬁnancial stability, and ultimately
comes crashing down... the real exchange is in many, though not all, instances a policy
variable...”
To investigate the relationship between macroeconomic policies and volatility, we
construct a simple measure of cross-country diﬀerences in volatility; the standard devi-
ation of the growth rate of per capita output. Our baseline period is 1970-97, but we
also look separately at diﬀerent decades. We take 1970 as the ﬁr s ty e a rb e c a u s eo fd a t a
availability reasons, and also because when we look at institutions, we want to start
from a point in time when all the countries in our sample are independent nations (not
colonies). In addition to volatility, we want to look at a measure of “severe crises”; with
this purpose, we also calculate the largest drop in output for every country for 1970-97
(or for subperiods) as a proxy for the severity of the most important crisis. Finally, we
also look at average growth as a measure of overall economic performance. Appendix
Table A2 gives means and standard deviations for these variables in various subsamples,
as well as descriptive statistics for some of the other variables we use in this paper.
9We have experimented with many diﬀerent measures of macroeconomic policies. In
this section, we report results using three diﬀe r e n tm e a s u r e st h a ta p p e a rt ow o r kb e s t
(i.e., they have the most robust eﬀect on our measures of economic performance and
volatility). These are average size of government (measured by government consumption
to GDP ratio), (log) average rate of inﬂation, and a measure of exchange rate overvalua-
tion, all of these calculated over the relevant periods. Average size of government is used
as a proxy for “irresponsible” ﬁscal policy (we chose this variable rather than a measure
of budget deﬁcits, since it appears to work better than budget deﬁcits, so gives a better
chance for this macro policy variable to matter against institutions). High inﬂation is
often viewed as a prime cause of volatility and poor economic performance. Overvalued
exchange rates are often unsustainable, and naturally lead to economic crises.5
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the bivariate relationship between these macroeconomic
variables, on the one hand, and economic volatility (standard deviation of growth),
crises (worst output drop) and growth, on the other. In all cases, we see the expected
relationship. Countries with large government sectors are more volatile and have more
severe crises. They also grow, on average, more slowly. The same is true for countries
with high inﬂation and overvalued exchange rates.
Do these correlations reﬂect the causal eﬀect of bad macroeconomic policies on eco-
nomic volatility and performance or are they capturing the eﬀect of institutional factors
on economic outcomes? This is the question we investigate in the next four sections.
5These variables refer to the following dates and are obtained from the following sources: government
consumption, from 1970 to 1989, obtained from Barro and Lee (1993) data set; and average inﬂation
for 1970-1998, from World Development Indicators, CD-ROM, 1999. Real exchange rate overvaluation
is for 1960-98, from Easterly and Levine (2002) who extend Dollar’s (1992) data. Appendix Table A1
gives further details on data sources. We have also experimented with other macroeconomic variables,
including volatility of exchange rate, size of government budget deﬁcit, black market premia, etc.. These
v a r i a b l e sh a v el e s sr o b u s te ﬀects on economic instability, and we obtain very similar results to those
reported below when we use these variables as well.
103 Institutions and Economic Performance
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show a correlation between macroeconomic policies and outcomes,
but they do not establish causality. Countries that pursue distortionary macroeco-
nomic policies are diﬀerent in a number of dimensions; most importantly, they diﬀer
substantially in their “social organization”. While some countries, such as the U.S.,
Australia or Canada, are democratic, relatively equal, suﬀer few radical social cleav-
ages and have a variety of checks and balances on politicians’ actions, others, such as
Ghana, Nicaragua, or Nigeria, ﬂuctuate between democracy and dictatorship, are highly
unequal, and lack eﬀective constraints on politicians and elites. We refer to this cluster
of social arrangements as “institutions” and think of the latter group of countries as
having “weak institutions”.
It is quite reasonable to suspect that weak institutions will have a signiﬁcant impact
on economic performance. In previous research, we documented a large eﬀect of this
type of institutions on economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001,
2002a; see also Knack and Keefer, 1995, Hall and Jones, 1999). There are also natural
reasons for why institutionally-weak countries might suﬀer substantial volatility, which
we discuss next.
3.1 Institutions and Volatility: Some Theoretical Ideas
Here we brieﬂy discuss why we might expect greater economic instability in institutionally-
weak societies.6
1. In institutionally-weak societies there are few constraints on rulers. Following a
change in the balance of political power, groups that gain politically may then
attempt to use their new power to redistribute assets and income to themselves,
in the process creating economic turbulence. In contrast, this source of turbu-
lence would be largely absent in societies where institutions prevent this type of
6See the previous version of the paper where we provide a simple dynamic model formalizing the
ﬁrst two ideas.
11redistribution.
2. Lack of eﬀective constraints on politicians and politically powerful groups implies
that there are greater gains from coming to power, and correspondingly, greater
losses from not controlling political power–thus, overall greater “political stakes”.
Therefore, in institutionally-weak societies, there will be greater inﬁghting between
various groups to come to power and enjoy these greater gains, and hence, greater
political and economic turbulence.
3. With weak institutions, economic cooperation may have to rely on “trust” or,
more explicitly, on cooperation supported by repeated games strategies. Shocks
may make it impossible to sustain cooperation, and lead to output collapses.
4. With weak institutions, contractual arrangements will be more imperfect, making
certain economic relationships more susceptible to shocks.
5. In societies with institutional problems, politicians may be forced to pursue un-
sustainable policies in order to satisfy various groups and remain in power, and
volatility may result when these policies are abandoned.
6. With weak institutions, entrepreneurs may choose sectors/activities from which
they can withdraw their capital more quickly, thus contributing to potential eco-
nomic instability.
Our empirical work will not be able to distinguish between these various channels
linking institutions to economic instability, though we believe that gaining a deeper un-
derstanding of the relative importance of various channels would be a major contribution
to our understanding. We leave this as a potential area for future research.
123.2 Sources of Volatility in Institutionally-Weak Societies: Two Case
Studies
In this subsection, we brieﬂy discuss the experiences of two institutionally-weak societies
with economic instability, Argentina and Ghana.
3.2.1 Ghana
Ghana was the ﬁrst European colony in Africa to become independent in 1958 and at
this time had roughly the same level of GDP per capita as South Korea. However, in
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decade and a half of relatively consistent of growth. The economic and political history
of Ghana has been marred by severe instability with military coups in 1966, 1972, 1978,
1979 and 1982 and re-democratizations in 1969, 1979 and 1996.
The anti-colonial movement was organized in Ghana by Kwame Nkrumah and his
Convention People’s Party (CPP) (see Austin, 1964, and Apter, 1972). However, as
soon as the promise of independence had been secured from the British the anti-colonial
coalition in Ghana crumbled. Chazan and Pellow note (1986, p. 30) “by 1951, with the
British agreement in principle to grant independence to the colony, this stage of decolo-
nization gave way to a period of domestic struggles for power on the eve of independence.
At this junction, the internal tensions that had been somewhat in check erupted into
an open clash over the control of the colonial state.” This left Nkrumah (who was
from a minor Akan ethnic group–the Nzima) with a very precarious political base. To
compensate for this Nkrumah engaged in a “divide and rule” strategy with respect to
the Ashanti (whose chiefs were one of his strongest opponents) by attempting to set
diﬀerent factions of commoners against the chiefs. The chiefs and their National Libera-
tion Movement (NLM) “met the nationalist appeal of the CPP with a rival nationalism
of its own, through an impassioned demand for recognition of the traditional unity of
the Ashanti nation,” Austin (1964, p. 250). This political strategy ensured Nkrumah’s
13power at independence in 1957. After the departure of the British, he moved to suppress
the opposition and altered the Constitution (in a fraudulent plebiscite) to strengthen
his powers. Pellow and Chazan (1986, p. 41) argue that
“The 1960 constitutional referendum ... augmented the powers of the ex-
ecutive ... Nkrumah was elected president of the First Republic, and thus,
for all intents and purposes, by 1960 Ghana had become a one-party state
with Nkrumah as its leader. The authoritarian tendencies apparent during
decolonization were oﬃcially entrenched in the centralized and personalized
pattern of government that emerged at this juncture.”
Despite the announced objectives of modernization, the need to stabilize political
power seems to have been the key determinant of economic policies. Pellow and Chazan
(1986, p. 45) argue that by 1964 the CPP had “reduced the role of the state to that
of a dispenser of patronage. By advocating the construction of a ramiﬁed bureaucracy,
Nkrumah established a new social stratum directly dependent on the state. By cur-
tailing the freedom of movement of these state functionaries through the diversion of
administrative tasks to political ends, the regime contributed directly to undermining
their eﬀective performance.”
The disastrous economic impact of the CPP’s policies have been well analyzed by
Bates (1981) (see also Owusu, 1970, and Leith and Loftchie, 1993). He showed that
t h eg o v e r n m e n tu s e dt h es t a t eC o c o am a r k e t i n gb o a r da n de x c h a n g er a t ep o l i c yt o
systematically expropriate the coca farmers who dominated the economy and exports.
The CPP transferred these rents to the urban and ethnic interests which supported
them. The fact that this redistribution took such an ineﬃcient form was explained both
by the inability of the central state to control or raise taxes in the countryside, and by
the political rationality of redistributing in ways which could be selectively targeted.
Bates (1981, p. 114) argues:
“Were the governments of Africa to confer a price rise on all rural producers,
14the political beneﬁts would be low; for both supporters and dissidents would
secure the beneﬁts of such a measure, with the result that it would generate
no incentives to support the government in power. The conferral of beneﬁts in
the form of public works projects, such as state farms, on the other hand, has
the political advantage of allowing the beneﬁts to be selectively apportioned.
The schemes can be given to supporters and withheld from opponents.”
Bates applied a similar argument to explain the overvaluation of the exchange rate.
When the foreign exchange market does not clear, the government has to ration access
to foreign exchange and can target allocations to supporters. In addition, and perhaps
more important, overvalued exchange rates directly transfer resources from the rural
sector to the urban sector, making it an attractive policy tool for the political elites.
These distortionary policies did not stop when Nkrumah was deposed in 1966; they
were in fact intensiﬁed right up until Rawlings’s policy changes of 1982 (see Herbst,
1993, on these changes and the more recent economic and political history).
Ghana therefore provides a clear example of how a range of distortionary policies, in-
cluding overvalued exchange rates, were motivated by the desire to redistribute income.
The bad eﬀects were so severe and debilitating for the economy because the institutional
environment inherited from Britain placed few, if any, constraints on what politicians
could do. Nkrumah and the CPP were able to build a one-party state, use the bureau-
cracy and economic policies for patronage and engage in mass corruption. The high
political stakes that resulted made it very attractive to be in power and induced intense
political instability, as shown by the very frequent coups, and political instability trans-
lated into economic instability. Overall, it seems fairly clear that in the Ghanaian case,
economic instability was caused mainly by institutional weaknesses, which was mediated
by a range of diﬀerent macro and micro policies.
153.2.2 Argentina
In any discussion of crises and poor growth in developing countries Argentina tends to
come near the top of anyone’s list. Argentina is the most famous case of a country which
ought to be relatively prosperous, and indeed was so until the 1920s. It is standard to
blame poor economic performance and volatility in Argentina on bad economic policies.
The usual candidate for low growth is inward-looking industrialization and irresponsible
ﬁscal policy (Krueger, 1993, Taylor, 1998).
The traditional story for why Argentina pursued such policies is the adoption of
misguided state-led development strategies as a result of the inﬂuence of economists
such as Prebisch and the dependency theorists (Krueger, 1993). Yet Peronist policies
predated Prebisch’s seminal work in 1950,7 and the reality is that Per´ on never followed
a coherent industrialization policy. Gerchunoﬀ ( 1 9 8 9 )s u m su pP e r o n i s te c o n o m i cp o l i c y
in the following way:
“there was no speciﬁc and uniﬁed Peronist economic policy, much less a
long-term development strategy. In spite of oﬃcial rhetoric about a plan,
the objective–and at times exclusive–priority was ... an economic order
capable of maintaining the new distributive model.”
The ﬁrst real statement of Prebisch’s views was in his famous work of 1950, and
he had no inﬂuence on policy in Argentina until 1955, when he was recalled from exile
following Per´ on’s fall from power.
A second view sees the great depression and the Second World War as leading to a
phase of “natural import substitution,” which then created an industrial interest group.
This interest group was suﬃciently strong that it could induce state subsidies and inter-
vention (this view is developed in Frieden, 2002). Both this theory and the one emphasiz-
ing mistaken economic theories see bad industrial policies and state intervention leading
also to unsustainable subsidization, ﬁscal insolvency, bankruptcy and hyperinﬂation.
7Per´ on came to power in 1943 and indeed Prebisch was hounded from Argentina and into exile in
Chile by Per´ on.
16A third view, popular in political science, sees the cause of the form of both macro-
economic and microeconomic policy in the rise and persistence of “populism” and more
speciﬁcally Peronism (Waisman, 1987, Collier and Collier, 1991, Roe, 1998). This view
tends to see structural changes in the economy, such as urbanization and the rise of
organized labor, as leading to particular sorts of political coalitions, favoring certain
policies, and preventing economic development.
Although there are undoubtedly aspects of truth in these explanations, a more satis-
factory account of poor economic policies in Argentina situates them in their institutional
context. It seems that Per´ on’s policies, and subsequent Argentinian policies, were not
really a reﬂection of a “full-blown Peronist growth strategy” as argued by Shleifer (1997),
or aimed at “the goal of rapid industrialization” and “the intent of building a domestic
industrial base behind tariﬀ rates,” as argued by Sachs (1990, p. 148). Instead, these
were policies intended to transfer resources from one segment of society to another, as
well as a method of maintaining power by politicians with a weak social base in an
institutionally-weak society (see, Gerchunoﬀ, 1989, and Mazzuca, 2001). In line with
this view, Diaz Alejandro (1970, p. 126) concludes that
“Peronist policies present a picture of a government interested not so much
in industrialization as in a nationalistic and populist policy of increasing the
real consumption, employment, and economic security of the masses–and
of the new entrepreneurs. It chose these goals even at the expense of capital
formation and of the economy’s capacity to transform.”
Where do the institutional weaknesses of the Argentine society come from?8 As a
Spanish colony Argentina had low population density and was something of a backwater
because of the focus on the mines of Peru and Bolivia. It thus avoided many of the
worse colonial institutions, such as the encomienda and the mita. Nevertheless, after in-
dependence Argentina suﬀered from severe political instability as rival regional warlords
8Our account here builds on Mazzuca (2001).
17and Caudillos vied for control of Buenos Aires and the country. An eﬀective national
state emerged only in the 1860s under the Presidency of Mitre. In order to secure com-
pliance, the constitutional settlement and institutions created then ceded large powers
to the provinces. Crucially, the central state never imposed upon the regions the type
of centralized institutions constructed historically in Europe. Mazzuca (2001) suggests,
building on the work of Tilly (1990) and Herbst (2000), that this was because: (1) the
Argentine regime did not face external threats to its sovereignty and was therefore never
forced to modernize; (2) both the expanding world commodity and ﬁnancial markets
gave the central governments enough ﬁscal resources that they could use to avoid the
costs of disciplining the provinces.9 Although this institutionalization of political power
did not impede the boom in Argentina up until 1920s, it left a legacy of political insti-
tutions which has had a crucial impact on policy over the last century. Our argument
is that in particular it has led to highly ineﬃcient forms of redistribution away from the
most productive parts of the country (Buenos Aires and the littoral) towards the eco-
nomically marginal, but politically salient provinces. Politicians undertook this type of
ineﬃcient redistribution using a variety of tools, ranging from ﬁscal policy and exchange
rate policy to microeconomic policies.
A tangible manifestation of this perverse institutionalization of political power can
been seen from the malapportionment of the Argentine congress. Samuels and Snyder
(2001, 2002) show that Argentina has the most malapportioned Senate in the world and
that the degree of malapportionment of Congress is about 2.5 times the world average
and 50% higher than the Latin America average.10 The four provinces of Buenos Aires,
Santa Fe, C´ ordoba and Mendoza contain 78% of national industrial production and 70%
of the total population, but control just 8 of the 48 seats in the senate, and 48% of the
9Rock (1987, p.125 ) notes “Mitre became adept in the dispensation of subsidies to the provinces.”
10Measuring malapportionment by the proportion of seats that are not allocated on the basis of one-
person one vote, the Argentine Senate has a score of 0.49 and the Congress 0.14. The world and Latin
American averages are, respectively, 0.27 and 0.19 for Upper Chambers and 0.09 and 0.06 for lower
chambers. Note that while the U.S. Senate is malapportioned (score 0.36), the U.S. Congress is not
malapportioned. Gibson, Calvo and Faletti (2001) provide evidence suggesting that it is malappor-
tionment in the lower chamber that is the main determinant of ﬁscal redistribution.
18seats in Congress. Gibson (1997) refers to these four provinces as the ‘core’ and the
other provinces as the ‘periphery’ and shows that political support from the periphery
has been crucial in Argentine politics (see also Germani, 1962, Mora y Araujo and
Llorente, 1980). In particular, the Peronists, despite the conventional wisdom that they
are the party of labor and urban interests, have always relied heavily on this support.
Gibson, Calvo and Faletti (2001, p. 11) argue that the importance of “overrepre-
sented peripheral region provinces in the national Peronist coalition has continued to
the present day, and during President Menem’s ﬁrst term they provided a major base of
support in the national legislature.” The nature of this political coalition led Menem to
insulate the periphery from most of his economic reforms. During his presidency, public
sector employment and subsidies to the periphery increased despite rapid retrenchment
and deregulation in Buenos Aires (Gibson, Calvo and Faletti, 2001, Table 6). This
structure of political institutions is important because it leads the peripheral regions
to be a crucial part of any political coalition and leads, as in Ghana, to the burden of
redistribution falling squarely on the most productive region of the country.
Nevertheless, political institutions such as these, while they may have large eﬀects
on policy, are not determined randomly. Indeed, malapportionment was intensiﬁed by
Per´ on in 1949 when he established a minimum of two deputies per province regardless
of population (Sawers, 1996, p. 194). It was further increased by the military in 1972
and the early 1980s in an attempt to weaken the power of urban interests in democracy.
This process was driven by the initial political equilibrium favoring the periphery and
thus further intensiﬁed the inherent institutional distortions.11
11There are many ways in which malapportionment can aﬀect the eﬃciency of economic policy. For
example, imagine that to put together a coalition, a President must give politicians enough redistribution
for them to be re-elected. In this case, it is cheaper to “buy” a politician from a peripheral province in
Argentina since he needs fewer votes to win. This “price” can inﬂuence the form that payment takes
(see the model by Lizerri and Persico, 2001, for a formalization of a related idea). For example, when
the price is low it may be rational to buy politicians with private goods (income transfers), while when
it is high (for instance in Buenos Aires) it is cheaper to use public goods. Malapportionment can then
lead to the undersupply of public goods. Moreover, anticipating the cost of ‘buying’ power, a President
may want to create malapportionment because he has to redistribute less in total and keeps more of
the rents from power.
19This perspective suggests that the repetitive nature of unsustainable and bad macro-
economic policies in Argentina stems from an underlying set of weak institutions, which
make massive redistribution of income feasible and even politically rational. This analy-
s i si sr a t h e rd i ﬀerent from much current analysis.
The recent crisis in Argentina has been explained by the collapse of an unsustain-
able economic model which involved tying the peso to the US dollar. This resulted in
overvaluation, domestic recession and a current account deﬁcit that had to be funded by
unsustainable international borrowing. The conventional wisdom is that the adoption of
this particular set of policies was an attempt to obtain credibility with ﬁnancial markets
(e.g. Rodrik, 2002). Instead, our perspective suggests that, as in Bates’s (1981) analysis
of the political economy of Africa, bad economic policies should be understood as part
of a package of often ineﬃcient redistributive tools. The currency board adopted by
Argentina also created clear winners and losers. The economically poor but politically
pivotal periphery gained transfers and was unthreatened by the adverse eﬀects of a crisis
that had greater eﬀects on the core and the middle classes (who are now being “expro-
priated” by a variety of methods).12 The persistent nature of crises and expropriation
in Argentina, and the fact that the same set of macroeconomic policies continually recur
and subsequently collapse (see della Paolera and Taylor, 2001) are consistent with our
interpretation.13
Some recent analyses (e.g. Caballero and Dornbusch, 2002) recognize the existence of
“political and social problems,” but still maintain the view that bad policy in Argentina
is either misguided or incompetent, and argue that the policy failures in Argentina can
now only be solved by an international takeover of ﬁscal and monetary policies. Our
analysis here suggests that this solution to instability and poor economic performance in
Argentina may not be successful. If at root the problems are weak institutions leading to
12Undoubtedly the form of the monetary policy helped to bring down inﬂation, but this does not
imply that the main objective of the set of policies adopted was to promote development and stability.
13As i g n i ﬁcant example of absence of constraints on the executive in Argentina is the ability of Menem
to re-write the Constitution in 1995 so that he could run for the presidency again.
20political conﬂict, highly ineﬃcient redistribution and outright predation, then, without
institutional change, distributional conﬂict is bound to resurface even if international
bankers are in control of monetary policy. There are always other instruments.
4E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
The discussion so far illustrates how we might expect both institutional diﬀerences
and diﬀerences in macroeconomicp o l i c i e st oc a u s ed i ﬀerences in macroeconomic per-
formance, especially in volatility and crises. We now discuss a simple empirical strategy
to make progress in distinguishing between these two sources of diﬀerences in volatility
and crises.
Ignoring nonlinearities, the economic relationship we are interested in identifying is:
Xc,t−1,t = Q
0
c,t−1,t · α + β · Ic,t=0 + Z
0
c,t−1,t · γ + θ · lnyc,t−1 + εc,t−1,t (1)
where Xc,t−1,t is the macroeconomic outcome of interest for country c between times
t and t − 1. The three outcomes that we will look at are overall volatility (standard
deviation of GDP per capita growth), severity of crises (worst output drop) and average
per capita growth. In our baseline regressions, the basic time period will be from 1970
to 1997 (this choice is dictated by data availability and our desire to start the analysis
at a point in time where the countries for which we have data are all independent nation
states). Q0
c,t−1,t is a vector of macroeconomic policies for country c between times t and
t−1. The three measures of macroeconomic policies we will look at are the ones shown
in Section 2: average size of government consumption, inﬂation, and real exchange rate
overvaluation.
Ic,t=0 is our measure of institutions at the beginning of the sample. We will use
the constraint on the executive variable from the Polity IV dataset, which measures
the extent of constitutional limits on the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive.
The Polity dataset reports a qualitative score, between 1 and 7, for every independent
country. In previous work (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002a),
21we showed that this measure is correlated with other measures of institutional quality
and with economic development. As our baseline measure, we use the average value
for this constraint from the Polity IV dataset for 1950, 1960 and 1970, assigning the
lowest score to countries that are not yet independent (and therefore not in the Polity
IV dataset).14 This is reasonable since in a country still under colonial control there are
typically few real constraints on the power of the rulers. Appendix Tables A3, A4 and
A5 provide results using constraint on the executive in 1970 as an alternative measure
of institutions, with qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results.
In addition, in equation (1), Zc,t−1,t is a set of other controls, and lnyc,t−1 is the log of
initial income per capita, which we include in some of the regressions. Following Barro
(1991) this variable is included in most growth regressions to control for convergence
eﬀects. It is also useful to include it in regressions of volatility or crises, since as shown
in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), poorer countries suﬀer substantially more volatility.
The parameters that we are interested in identifying are α and β,t h ee ﬀect of macro-
economic policy variables and institutions.15 The simplest strategy is to estimate the
model in equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. There are two
distinct problems with this strategy:
1. Both institutions and macro policy variables are endogenous, so we may be cap-
turing reverse causality, or the eﬀect of some omitted characteristics (geography,
culture, or other variables) on both policy (or institutions) and economic outcomes.
2. Both institutions and policy variables are measured with error, or in the case
14We take these averages of 1950, 1960 and 1970 as our baseline measure, rather than simply use the
1970 value of the index, since we are interested in the long-run component of these constraints (not
in the year-to-year ﬂuctuations) and also because the Polity dataset gives high scores to a number of
former colonies in 1970 that subsequently drop by a large amount. This reﬂects the fact that many of
these countries adopted the constitution of their former colonial powers, but did not really implement
the constitution or introduce eﬀective checks.
15In addition it is interesting to look at whether there is an interaction between institutions and
macro policy variables. We can add the interaction term Q0
c,t−1,t·Ic,t−1, and investigate whether there
is a non-monotonic relationship between institutions and volatility, i.e., add higher order terms Ic,t−1
to the regression equation (1). In our empirical work, such interaction and higher order terms are never
signiﬁcant, so we do not report them in the paper.
22of institutions, available measures correspond only poorly to the desired concept
(more explicitly, while the institutions we have in mind are multi-dimensional,
“constraint on the executive” only measure one of these dimensions, and that
quite imperfectly).
Both of these concerns imply that OLS regressions will give results that do not corre-
spond to the causal eﬀect of institutions and policy variables on economic outcomes. So
we would like to estimate equation (1) using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with dis-
tinct and plausible instruments for both macro policy variables and institutions. These
instruments should be correlated with the endogenous regressors, and they should be
orthogonal to any other omitted characteristics and not correlated with the outcomes of
interest through any other channel than their eﬀect via the endogenous regressors.
In this paper, we pursue the strategy of instrumenting for institutions using the
historically-determined component of institutions, arising from the colonial experience
of former colonies. The instrument will be discussed in detail in the next section. To the
extent that the instrument is valid, it will solve the endogeneity, the omitted variables
bias and the measurement error problems. In particular, if the instrument is valid, we can
estimate the eﬀect of institutions on economic outcomes, the β parameters, consistently
in models that exclude the macro policy variables.
When the macro policy variables are also included, the simplest strategy is to treat
them as exogenous. Ignoring the measurement error problem, the coeﬃcients on these
policy variables, the α parameters, will be typically biased upwards. The Appendix of
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) shows that in this case there may also be a
downward bias in β,t h ee ﬀect of institutions on outcomes. Therefore, our simplest strat-
egy of instrumenting for institutions and treating macro policy variables as exogenous is
“conservative”, in the sense that it stacks the cards against ﬁnding a substantial role for
institutions and in favor of ﬁnding an important role for macro policy variables (unless
measurement error in these policy variables is a major problem). Moreover, equation
(1) shows that we are using contemporary averages of the macro variables, while using
23lagged values of institutions. This is again in the spirit of stacking the cards in favor of
ﬁnding a signiﬁcant role for macro variables. As it turns out almost all of our regres-
sions will show a major role for institutions, and more limited and less robust inﬂuence
from the macro variables. So our conservative strategy makes the interpretation of these
results simpler.
A caveat for the above discussion is that if the measurement error in macro variables is
signiﬁcant, their coeﬃcients might be biased downward due to attenuation bias. Since we
are taking thirty-year averages of these variables, the measurement error problem should
not be too severe.16 As an alternative strategy for dealing both with attenuation bias
and endogeneity of the macro variables, we also report regressions where we instrument
for the macro variables with their lagged values when available. We will see that these
speciﬁcations give similar results to those where these policy variables are treated as
exogenous.
Another possible concern is that distortionary policy may matter for macroeconomic
variables, but we may be unable to detect this because we are taking averages over
thirty-year periods. This would be the case if, for example, some of the countries go
through a period of about 5 to 10 years of high inﬂa t i o no ra no v e r v a l u e de x c h a n g e
rate, causing major crises, but during other periods they have oﬀsetting low inﬂation
and undervalued exchange rates, making their average policies similar to those in other
countries. To deal with this problem, we estimate a variation on our basic regression
using a panel of 5-year averages for each country between 1970 and 1997 (or shorter
periods for some of the macro variables), with the following structure:
Xc,t−1,t = Q
0
c,t−1,t · α + β · Ic,t=0 + Z
0
c,t−1,t · γ + θ · lnyc,t−1 + δt−1,t + εc,t−1,t, (2)
w h e r ea l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa r ed e ﬁned similarly to equation (1), except that we now have a
full set of time eﬀects for every ﬁve-year episode, the δt−1,t terms. In addition, we still
16Unless there is again attenuation bias caused by the variables in question not corresponding to the
conceptually appropriate policy variables. We believe this possibility is unlikely in the case of the policy
variables, since these are the variables emphasized in the policy discussions and the relevant literature,
and we have experimented with many other variables.
24use the institutions at the beginning of the sample, Ic,t=0. Recall that our interest is in
the historically-determined component of institutions (that is more clearly exogenous),
hence not in the variations in institutions from year-to-year. As a result, this regression
d o e sn o t( c a n n o t )c o n t r o lf o raf u l ls e to fc o u n t r yd u m m i e s .S i n c ew eh a v em o r et h a n
one observation per country, but one of our key regressors only varies by country, we
cluster the standard errors by country (using the Stata robust standard errors). If some
countries have volatile macroeconomic policies that matter only when they reach very
extreme values, this speciﬁcation should show a greater role for policy variables than the
cross-sectional regression (1). In practice, estimates of the impact of policy variables on
volatility, crises and growth from equations (1) and (2) are quite similar.
5 Sources of Variation in Institutions
The empirical strategy outlined in Section 4 relies on a valid instrument for institu-
tions. Our idea is to exploit the historically-determined component of institutions, or in
other words, instrument for institutions with historical variables. This clearly solves the
simple “reverse causality” problem, and to the extent that the instrument is plausibly
orthogonal to other omitted determinants of economic outcomes, such as volatility, crises
and growth, it also avoids the omitted variable bias. Also, the instrumentation strategy
removes the attenuation bias (as long as the “measurement error” or the conceptual dis-
crepancy between our measure and the true concept can be approximated by classical
measurement error).
5.1 Historical Determinants of Institutions Among Former European
Colonies
The set of former European colonies provides an attractive sample for isolating the
historically-determined component of institutions, since the institutions in almost all
of the former colonies have been heavily inﬂuenced by their colonial experience (see
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, for a more detailed discussion on this point).
25In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002a), we contrasted institutions of
private property, which protect the property rights of a broad segment of society, and
extractive institutions, which lack constraints on elites and politicians. We argued that
institutions of private property, which correspond to eﬀective constraints on elites and
rulers, were more likely to arise when Europeans settled in large numbers, and set up
institutions protecting their own rights. The “Neo-Europes,” the U.S., Canada, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, are perhaps the best examples of the high European settlement
associated with the development of good institutions. In contrast, extractive institutions
emerged when Europeans pursued a strategy of extracting resources from the colonies
without settling and without developing participatory institutions. While there are many
determinants of the exact colonization strategy pursued by European powers, an impor-
tant determinant is naturally whether Europeans could settle or not, since where they
could not settle, the extractive strategy was much more likely.17 Therefore, in places
where the disease environment was not favorable to European health and settlement, we
expect the formation of extractive states, and today the presence of weak institutions,
as these extractive institutions persist. This reasoning suggests that proxies for mortal-
ity rates expected by the ﬁrst European settlers in the colonies could be an instrument
for current institutions in these countries. Schematically, the reasoning underlying this
instrumentation strategy is:
(potential) settler







Based on this reasoning, we use data on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and
sailors stationed in the colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries (Curtin, 1989, and
1998, and Gutierrez, 1986). These give a good indication of the mortality rates faced
by settlers. Europeans were well informed about these mortality rates at the time, even
though they did not know how to control the diseases that caused these high mortality
17Another important determinant appears to be population density. Europeans were less likely to
settle in already densely-settled areas, and more likely to pursue extractive strategies given the level
of settlement (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002a). We obtain similar results to those reported
below if we use population density in 1500 as an additional instrument.
26rates, especially yellow fever and malaria (see the discussion in Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2001).
A major concern is the validity of the exclusion restriction presumed by this instru-
mentation strategy–i.e., whether the mortality rates faced by the settlers between the
17th and 19th centuries could actually have an eﬀect on current outcomes through an-
other channel. Probably the most important threat to the validity of our instrument
comes from the correlation between European mortality rates over 100 years ago and
the health of the current population or climate, and the eﬀect of current health and
climate on current economic outcomes. We believe that this concern does not invalidate
our approach and that our exclusion restriction is plausible. The majority of European
deaths in the colonies were caused by malaria and yellow fever. Although these diseases
were fatal to Europeans who had no immunity, they had much more limited eﬀects on
indigenous adults who, over the centuries, had developed various types of immunities.
These diseases are therefore unlikely to be the reason why many countries in Africa and
Asia are very poor today. This notion is supported by the mortality rates of local people
in high-settler mortality areas, which were comparable to the mortality rates of British
troops serving in Britain or in healthier colonies (see for example Curtin, 1998, Table
2). To substantiate the validity of our instrumentation approach, in Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001) we showed that the results are robust to controlling for climate,
humidity, other geographic variables, and current health conditions, and that we obtain
very similar results exploiting only diﬀerences in European mortality due to yellow fever,
which is an attractive source of variation, since yellow fever has been mostly eradicated.
On the basis of these ﬁndings, we take mortality rates of European settlers between the
17th and 19th centuries as an instrument for current institutions in the former colonies.18
Figure 5 shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship between our constraint on the executive
variable (an average for 1950, 1960 and 1970) and the log of European settler mortality
in annualized deaths per thousand mean strength. This measure reports the death
18We also show in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) that these mortality rates were a ﬁrst-
order determinant of early institutions, and these institutional diﬀerences have persisted to the present.
27rate among 1,000 soldiers where each death is replaced with a new soldier and was the
standard measure in army records, where much of the information comes from. We use
logs rather than levels, since otherwise some of the African observations are extreme
outliers. The ﬁgure shows a strong relationship between the measure of institutions
used in this paper and settler mortality more than 100 years ago. Our interpretation is
that this reﬂects the causal eﬀect of colonial policies on current institutions, and hence
it can serve as a useful source of variation for identifying the eﬀect of institutions on
macroeconomic outcomes.
5.2 Institutions and Economic Outcomes: A First Look
We now brieﬂy look at the relationship between the historically-determined component
of institutions and current economic outcomes. The ﬁrst column in Table 1 replicates
our main regression from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), which looks at the
eﬀect of institutional diﬀerences on (log) income per capita today. The lower part of the
panel shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship. In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001),
we used average protection against expropriation risk between 1985 and 1995 as our
measure of institutions. Here, we prefer a measure that refers to the beginning of our
sample (i.e., 1970), and protection against expropriation is not available for the 1960s
and 1970s. Column 4 replicates the same regression using the constraint on the executive
variable used in this paper. The ﬁrst-stage relationship for this regression is shown in
Figure 5.
Columns 7 and 10 turn to a regression of the average growth rate between 1970
and 1997 on an average of constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, again
instrumented by log settler mortality (with or without controlling for initial income).
Throughout the paper, we express all growth rates in percentage points (e.g., 2 percent
rather than 0.02) to save on decimal points; see Appendix Table A2 for summary sta-
tistics. Column 7 shows a statistically signiﬁcant relationship, indicating faster growth
in the postwar era among countries with better historically-determined institutions. For
28example, the coeﬃcient of 0.75 implies that a country like the U.S., with a value of
constraint on the executive of 7, is predicted to grow about 3 percent a year faster
than a country like Nigeria, with a score of 3. The coeﬃcient estimate of the eﬀect
of initial “constraint on the executive” on growth becomes larger when we control for
initial income in column 10, but also the standard error more than triples (though the
coeﬃcient is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). This is a pattern we see
throughout the paper; regressions with economic growth as the dependent variable are
less robust than regressions for volatility or largest output drop, especially when we con-
trol for initial income. At some level, it is not surprising that the relationship between
the historically-determined component of institutions and postwar growth becomes sub-
stantially weaker when we control for initial income: initial income is determined largely
by institutions, so our measure of institutions and initial income are highly correlated.
In fact, much of the divergence among former colonies took place between 1750 and
1950, when countries with good institutions took advantage of industrialization and
modernization opportunities, and those with extractive institutions failed to do so (see
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002a). So our measure of institutions may be a
much better determinant of the level of income in 1970 than subsequent growth.
It is useful to know whether the relationship between the historically-determined
component of institutions and economic outcomes is driven mainly by the contrast be-
tween rich and poor nations. Columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 report similar regressions for
countries above the median world per capita income in 1970 (using the Summers-Heston
income per capita data for that year, from the Barro and Lee dataset). In these regres-
sions, and all those in subseqent tables that use this subsample, we drop Gabon, which
is an outlier with high volatility (including Gabon in this subsample does not change the
results). In Table 1, the estimates for this subsample are similar to, but slightly lower
than, those for the sample of all excolonies. They continue to be highly signiﬁcant in
income level regressions (columns 2 and 5), but are only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level in the growth regressions (columns 8 and 11).
29Finally, columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 report regressions for excolonies without Africa, to
show that the eﬀect of the historically-determined component of institutions on income
level and growth is not driven by a contrast between African and non-African nations.
In this smaller sample, the 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of institutions on economics
outcome is again slightly lower than that for all excolonies. Nevertheless, this estimate
is still signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in the income level regressions, and signiﬁciant
at the 10 percent in the growth regressions. In the subsequent analysis, we ﬁnd that the
results without Africa are similar to those that just use countries above median world
per capita income, so we just report the latter.
6 Institutions, Macroeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Outcomes
In this section we look at the eﬀect of institutions and macroeconomic policies on volatil-
ity, and also on the severity of crises and growth. We start with the relationship between
institutions and macro variables, and then investigate their relative inﬂuences on volatil-
ity more carefully. In the next section, we investigate the robustness of the relationship
between institutions and volatility in more detail, and look for potential mechanisms.
6.1 The Effect of Institutions on Policies and Volatility
Table 2 shows the relationship between institutions, on the one hand, and the three
macroeconomic variables discussed above and our measures of volatility and crises, on
the other. More speciﬁcally, we run regressions of the form
Qc,t−1,t = β
q · Ic,t=0 + ε
q
c,t−1,t,a n d ( 3 )
Xc,t−1,t = β
x · Ic,t=0 + ε
x
c,t−1,t,
where Q denotes the macro policy variables, X denotes our measures of volatility and
crises, and Ic,t=0 is the measure of constraint on the executive at the beginning of the
sample (average constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970).
I nP a n e lA ,w eﬁrst report OLS estimates of equation (3). These regressions show
30that weaker institutions are associated with larger government sectors, higher inﬂation
rates, more overvalued exchange rates, greater volatility, and more severe crises (though
the associations between institutions and macroeconomic policy variables are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the sample of former colonies above median world income).
Our interest is not in statistical associations, but in uncovering the causal eﬀect
of institutions on macroeconomic distortions and volatility. For this reason, Panel B
reports 2SLS estimates of equation (3). In these estimates, the institutions variable is
instrumented with log settler mortality. The ﬁrst-stage relationships for institutions are
identical to those shown in Table 1 (since there are no other covariates here).
The results are similar to the OLS estimates, but somewhat stronger. For example,
the coeﬃcient on Ic,t=0 in the government consumption regression changes from -0.012
to -0.018. This indicates that the attenuation bias caused by our use of imperfect mea-
sures of institutions is probably more serious than the endogeneity bias (see Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001, for a discussion on this issue). To the extent that our in-
strument is valid, this corresponds to the causal eﬀect of institutions on macroeconomic
policies. We can therefore conclude that some societies pursue distortionary macroeco-
nomic policies, in particular, in the form of high inﬂation, larger government sectors,
overvalued exchange rates and other distortionary macroeconomic prices because they
have (or have had) weak institutions. This raises the question of whether the correlation
between the distortionary policies and macroeconomic volatility (and other bad macro-
economic outcomes) shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4 reﬂects the eﬀect of macroeconomic
policies or the direct eﬀect of institutional problems working through other potentially
non-macroeconomic channels.
The bottom panel of Table 2 also shows the relationship between institutions and
volatility (columns 7 through 10) and severity of crises (columns 11 through 14). Coun-
tries with institutional problems suﬀer substantially more volatility. For example, the
estimate of -0.83 in column 9 (bottom panel) implies that a 1 point higher score in
the institutional index translates into about a 0.83 decline in the standard deviation
31of growth. So on the basis of this estimate, we should expect a country like the U.S.,
which has an institutional score of 7, to have a standard deviation 3.32 lower than a
country like Nigeria which has an institutional score of 3. This gap is approximately
two-thirds of the actual gap in standard deviation between the U.S. (2.16) and Nigeria
(7.37) in the data, which is 5.21. When we also control for initial income, the coeﬃcient
is -1.56, and correspondingly, the predicted volatility diﬀerence between the U.S. and
Nigeria is now 6.24, which is a little larger than the actual gap. Notice however that
in this speciﬁcation including initial income, the standard error on the institutions vari-
able is substantially larger (0.58 instead of 0.20). This is not surprising since, as noted
above, the historically-determined component of institutions is a very good predictor for
income in 1970, making our institutions variable and log in GDP per capita 1970 highly
colinear. Nevertheless, our institutions variable is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, while
the initial income variable is not signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. This is a pattern we
will see repeatedly below, and suggests that institutions have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect above
and beyond the inﬂuence of initial income on volatility emphasized in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997).19
Recall that to the extent that our instrument for institutional diﬀerences is valid,
what we are estimating in this bottom panel of Table 2 is the causal eﬀect of institutional
diﬀerences on volatility. So the key questions are whether this causal eﬀect is being
mediated by macroeconomic variables such as inﬂation, ﬁscal policy and exchange rate
policy, and whether diﬀerences in these macroeconomic policies unrelated to institutions
have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on volatility and macroeconomic outcomes. We turn to these
issues next.
19It also suggests that the relationship between initial income and volatility, which Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) interpreted as due to lack of sectoral diversiﬁcation in relatively poor countries, may be
related to institutional factors.
326.2 Institutions Versus Macroeconomic Policies: Interpretation
How can we interpret the results from regressions as in equations (1) and (2), which
include both institutions and macroeconomic variables? Imagine that we are estimating
these regressions with volatility as the dependent variable. We know from Table 2 that
institutions have an eﬀect on volatility, which we can interpret as causal as long as we
trust the validity of our instruments. So now imagine adding the macro variables, Q,
to regressions of measures of volatility and crises on institutions. Consider the following
alternative scenarios:
1. If we ﬁnd institutions are insigniﬁcant, while macroeconomic policies are signiﬁ-
cant, the most likely interpretation, in light of the results of Table 2 that show that
a large “causal” eﬀect of institutions on volatility, is that institutions have an ef-
fect on volatility, but these speciﬁc macroeconomic policies are the main (primary)
mediating channel for this eﬀect. (This naturally does not rule out that macro-
economic policies may have an independent eﬀect, unrelated to the importance of
institutions.) Since macroeconomic policies are the main mediating channel, these
results would suggest that getting macroeconomic policies right, as prescribed by
the Washington consensus, is likely to be an important policy priority.
2. If, on the other hand, both institutions, I, and macroeconomic policies, Q,a r e
found to be robustly signiﬁcant, it would appear that both have independent ef-
fects on volatility, and part of the eﬀect of institutions may be mediated through
macroeconomic policies, while some part of it is not. We can determine approxi-
mately how much of the eﬀect of institutions is mediated by macroeconomic policy
variables by looking at the change in the coeﬃcient on institutions between the
speciﬁcations with and without the macro variables. If this coeﬃcient changes only
little, it would appear that these speciﬁc macroeconomic policies are not the main
mediating channel for the eﬀect of institutions on volatility (or other economic
outcomes).
333. Finally, if we ﬁnd that institutions, I,a r es i g n i ﬁcant and macroeconomic policies,
Q, are not, the most likely interpretation is that the causal eﬀect of institutions on
volatility is not mediated mainly through macroeconomic policies, but through a
range of other, probably microeconomic, policies. Macroeconomic policies in this
case might still have an eﬀect in individual cases; but they are not the system-
atic channel via which institutions impact on volatility. In this case, the eﬀect
of institutions on volatility is likely to be working not through a particular mech-
anisms, but via a variety of microeconomic, as well as macroeconomic, channels
(thus potentially leading to the “seesaw eﬀects” mentioned in the introduction).
6.3 Institutions Versus Macroeconomic Policies: Volatility
We now estimate models as in equations (1) and (2), with volatility as the dependent
variable. The results presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 show a robust eﬀect of institutions,
and no eﬀects from government consumption or inﬂation.20 Overvaluation is, on the
other hand, signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations, but has a relatively small eﬀect on the
coeﬃcient of the institutions variable. These results therefore favor an interpretation in
which standard macroeconomic variables play a minor role relative to institutional causes
that create economic instability through a variety of channels, though overvaluation
of the exchange rate appears one of the channels linking weak institutions to greater
instability, even if not the primary channel.
In Table 3, we report regressions with volatility as the dependent variable, and
average ratio of government consumption to GDP (a measure of average government
size) as the macro variable. We chose this variable as it appears to be a better predictor
of macroeconomic outcomes during this period than measures of the budget deﬁcit.
The ﬁrst three columns in the top panel document a strong relationship between the
size of government and volatility, without controlling for institutions, as already shown
20These baseline results use the average constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970. See
Appendix Table A3 for results using constraint on the executive in 1970.
34in Figure 2. The second panel shows that a similar but weaker relationship applies
when we control for initial income. Greater government size is associated with greater
instability. The rest of the table shows that adding institutions reduces the importance
of the government size variable, which is never found to be signiﬁcant.21
In columns 4 and 5, we start with OLS regressions, where institutions are treated
as exogenous. These regressions show a negative relationship between constraint on the
executive and volatility, both in the full excolonies sample and in the smaller sample of
excolonies above median world income. The correlation between government consump-
tion and volatility is no longer signiﬁcant. The results are similar when we control for
initial income in Panel B: institutions continue to be signiﬁcant and government size is
not.
In columns 6 and 7, we instrument for institutions using (potential) European settler
mortality, as in previous tables, and treat government size as exogenous. The eﬀect
of institutions on volatility is now stronger, and there is also no eﬀect of government
consumption (the coeﬃcient is now almost zero down from 8.09).
Average size of government over the sample period may be correlated with other
determinants of volatility, and may also be measured with error. To deal with these
endogeneity and attenuation issues, column s8a n d9i n s t r u m e n tf o rg o v e r n m e n ts i z e
using past government size. Now the government size variable has the opposite sign to
those in columns 1, 2 and 3 and is far from being signiﬁc a n t . T h i si sd e s p i t et h ef a c t
that there is a good ﬁrst-stage relationship for government size (the t-statistic on past
government consumption is over 10, and the R2 of the ﬁrst-stage regression is 0.69).
Therefore, the cross-sectional regressions in Panels A and B suggest that diﬀerences in
government size are not a major determinant of the volatility over the thirty-year period
we are looking at.
It is also worth noting that the (instrumented) eﬀect of initial institutions on volatility
21T os a v es p a c ew ed on o tr e p o r tt h eﬁrst-stage relationship for institutions, which is very similar to
the regressions reported in Table 2 (though not identical since other variables are now also included in
the ﬁrst stage).
35we estimate in these two panels are very simila rt ot h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e2 .F o re x a m p l e ,
in Table 2, the eﬀect of initial constraint on the executive on volatility is around -0.8
in models that do not control for initial income, and around -1.6 in models that control
for initial income. When we also control for government size as in Table 3, the eﬀect
of initial institutions on volatility is very similar: the coeﬃcient is now -0.82 without
initial income and -1.56 with initial income.
The models reported in Panels A and B are based on the estimation of equation (1),
which looks at the relationship between volatility and government size over the thirty-
year period (1970-97). As discussed above, some countries may experience short periods
of large government spending, causing major crises, while during other periods they may
have oﬀsetting low spending, thus resulting in average government size similar to that
in other countries. To investigate this possibility, in Panels C and D, we estimate the
panel regression equation (2). The ﬁrst three columns show the eﬀect of government
size without controlling for institutions. When we add institutions, the government size
variable is again found not to be a key determinant of volatility. Instead, there is a
robust relationship between initial institutions and subsequent volatility between 1970
and 1997.
Table 4 repeats the same exercise as Table 3, but using log inﬂation rather than
government consumption. We use the log of average inﬂation rather than the level of
inﬂation, since the relationship between volatility and inﬂation is stronger when we use
the log speciﬁcation and less aﬀected by outliers. Panels A and B estimate equation (1),
with and without initial income. The basic patterns are the same. Throughout, there is
ar o b u s te ﬀect of institutions on volatility, with very similar coeﬃcients to those found
in Table 2 (in instrumented regressions using the full sample, the coeﬃcient is -0.83
without initial income and -1.57 with initial income). There is no evidence that inﬂation
matters for volatility in the full sample of former colonies, either in the cross-section or
in the 5-year panel, although it is signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations for the sample of
former colonies above median world income.
36Table 5 turns to exchange rate overvaluation, and uses the index of exchange rate
overvaluation constructed by David Dollar (1992) and updated by Easterly and Levine
(2002).22 The ﬁrst three columns show a strong relationship between real exchange rate
overvaluation when the importance of institutions is not taken into account. When the
next column includes institutions in the regression, the eﬀect of overvaluation remains
signiﬁcant. Initial institutions also continue to have a large and statistically-signiﬁcant
eﬀect on volatility, with a coeﬃcient about 1/4 less than the corresponding estimate
without controlling for exchange rate overvaluation.23 When we also control for initial
income per capita in Panel B, the eﬀect of overvaluation is still signiﬁcant, and initial
constraint on the executive is also highly signiﬁcant, but with a smaller coeﬃcient than
our baseline estimates. These results suggest that misaligned exchange rates are a me-
diating channel for the eﬀect of institutions on volatility, but probably not the primary
mediating channel.
Overall, the results presented in this subsection suggest that the historically-determined
component of institutions has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on volatility, and neither inﬂation nor
government consumption (nor the other standard macro variables we examined) seem to
be the main mediating channel, though exchange rate overvaluation is typically corre-
lated with volatility. Our interpretation of these results is that a fundamental determi-
nant of thirty-year volatility diﬀerences is institutional diﬀerences across countries, and
that institutional diﬀerences create economic instability through a variety of microeco-
nomic channels as well as the often-emphasized macroeconomic channels.
22Due to data availability, we use the average value of this overvaluation index from 1960 to 1998,
generously provided by Bill Easterly and Ross Levine. Because we only have an average value for the
entire period, we cannot instrument using lagged values as in Tables 3 and 4. We have also checked
the results using the variability of overvaluation from Dollar (1992), but as this does not change our
r e s u l t sw eo m i ti th e r ef r o mt h ed i s c u s s i o n .
23The coeﬃcient on institutions in Table 3 is -0.83, but once we limit the sample to the former colonies
for which we have data on real exchange rate overvaluation, the coeﬃcient on institutions drops to -0.69.
The coeﬃcient in Table 5 -0.49.
376.4 Institutions Versus Macroeconomic Policies: Crises
Table 6 presents a number of speciﬁc a t i o n st h a tl o o ka tt h ei m p a c to fm a c r ov a r i a b l e s
and institutions on the severity of crises, measured by the largest output drop during
the sample. Each of the three diﬀerent panels refers to one of the three macro variables
we considered so far. In all cases, our measure of institutions, average constraint on the
executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, is instrumented by settler mortality (See Appendix
Table A4 for results using constraint on the executive in 1970).
The picture that emerges from this table is similar to that from Tables 3, 4 and 5.
In most speciﬁcations there is a substantial eﬀect of initial constraint on the executive
on severity of crises, and this eﬀect remains statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional
levels even when we control for initial income. In most speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of
initial institutions is again comparable to the baseline results in Table 2 (in Table 2,
the coeﬃcient on institutions in the 2SLS regression on worst output performance is
around -2.5 when we do not control for initial income, and around -5 when we control
for initial income; the range of estimates in this table are tightly around these values).
We also ﬁnd that government consumption and log average inﬂation do not appear to
have an eﬀect on the severity of crises when we take the inﬂuence of institutions into
account. In contrast to our results with volatility, the extent of overvaluation of the real
exchange rate is also insigniﬁcant, and only slightly reduces the eﬀect of institutions on
the severity of crises.
These results conﬁrm the conclusion of the previous section that there appears to be
a close a link between institutions and economic instability, most likely not mediated
primarily through the standard macroeconomic variables.
6.5 Institutions Versus Macroeconomic Policies: Economic Growth
Table 7 looks at the relationship between macroeconomic variables and institutions, on
the one hand, and economic growth, on the other. As in Table 6, the three panels
38of the table refer to three diﬀerent macro variables, and in all cases we also include
institutions, average constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, instrumented
by our historical instruments (See Appendix Table A5 for results using constraint on
the executive in 1970).
In the full sample of excolonies (odd-numbered columns), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of initial institutions on growth, no eﬀects from government consumption, some eﬀects
from inﬂation, and stronger eﬀects from overvaluation. When we limit the sample to
excolonies above median world income, and especially when we also control for initial
income, the eﬀect of institutions on growth is weaker. Our interpretation is the same
as the one we oﬀered above: much of the divergence in income happened between 1750
and 1950, when countries with good institutions grew rapidly, and those with extractive
institutions failed to do so (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002a). By 1970, much of
this process of adjustment was complete, and the eﬀect of institutions on further growth
is correspondingly weaker. Moreover, the sample of former colonies above median world
income is relatively small, and exhibits limited variation in growth. In this light, these
weaker results may not be so surprising.
7 Institutions and Volatility: Robustness and Mechanisms
The previous section documented a strong relationship between institutions and eco-
nomic volatility, and presented evidence suggesting that this relationship was not me-
diated through any of the standard macroeconomic variables. In this section, we inves-
tigate the relationship between institutions and volatility further, and show that it is
robust to controlling for a variety of other potential determinants of economic instabil-
ity. We then investigate the empirical validity of some potential mechanisms via which
institutions might be aﬀecting volatility.
397.1 Robustness
Table 8 reports regressions of volatility on institutions, while also controlling for a num-
ber of potential determinants of volatility. In particular, in various columns, we control
for all the macro variables together, the initial level of education, the importance of
ﬁnancial intermediation, the variability of terms of trade times the share of exports, and
we also estimate models excluding outliers.
In columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 8, we add all the macro variables together,
with or without initial income. Initial constraint on the executive has a negative eﬀect
on volatility. Without controlling for initial income, this eﬀect is signiﬁcant, but some-
what smaller than in Table 2. When we also control for initial income, the standard
error increases but the coeﬃcient on institutions remains very similar in size to the co-
eﬃcients reported in Table 2. The eﬀect of initial income is not signiﬁcant. Jointly, the
macro variables are insigniﬁcant as shown by the p-value. In Panel B, we run the same
regressions, but this time in a manner similar to the panel regression in equation (2),
with each observation corresponding to a 5-year period. Now the eﬀects of the macro
variables are even weaker, and the constraint on the executive is consistently signiﬁcant,
with very similar coeﬃcients to before (again the standard errors in this lower panel are
clustered by country).
In columns 3 and 4 we control for years of schooling in 1970 (from Barro and Lee,
1993). This is a useful speciﬁcation, since, as we argue in Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001), historical institutions determined various components of investments,
including investments in human capital, so we expect education levels in 1970 to be cor-
related with the historically-determined component of institutions. It is then important
to know whether the eﬀect of institutions on volatility is working primarily through some
educational mechanism. When we include human capital, constraint on the executive
continues to have a negative eﬀect, similar in magnitude to our previous results, but it is
no longer signiﬁcant. This is because human capital and constraint on the executive are
highly correlated. But, the years of schooling variable is very far from being signiﬁcant,
40and in fact, it has the wrong sign. In the lower panel where we run regressions for the
5-year panel, the human capital variable continues to be insigniﬁcant, but now the initial
constraint on the executive is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, with a similar coeﬃcient
to that found in Table 2. These results suggest that the eﬀect of initial constraint is not
working through an educational channel.
In columns 5 and 6 we add (log of) the ratio of real M2 to GDP as a measure
of the importance of ﬁnancial intermediation (see Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000,
for the use of this variable in this context). Many macroeconomists emphasize weak
ﬁnancial intermediation as a primary cause of economic volatility. Again we ﬁnd no
strong evidence supporting this claim. The ﬁnancial intermediation variables are not
signiﬁcant, and initial constraint on the executive is signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations.24
In columns 7 and 8, we control for other determinants of variability, including terms
of trade variability, the export share of the GDP, and the interaction between these two
variables. In columns 9 and 10 we also exclude some outliers. The results are very similar
to our baseline results, showing that the eﬀect of the historically-determined component
of institutions on volatility is robust, and is not simply driven by some other sources of
output variability correlated with institutions.25
Table 9 further checks the robustness of our results in two ways: with additional
control variables and by restricting the sample. Panel A adds additional control vari-
ables. La Porta et al. (1998) have argued for the importance of investor protection,
and Johnson et al. (2000) found that investor protection measures were signiﬁcantly
correlated with exchange rate depreciations and stock market declines across emerging
markets in 1997-98. In columns 1 and 2, we add the measure of de jure shareholders’
24This is consistent with the results in Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2002), who, in a diﬀerent
context, also ﬁnd that property rights appear to matter more than the availability of external ﬁnance.
25We have also run the regressions as in Table 8 using a diﬀerent measure of institutions, average
protection against expropriation risk, which was our main variable in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). This variable refers to a later period and hence is not ideal for our purposes here. However, as
we are instrumenting for institutions with historical variables, this may not matter too much. In any
case, the results in with this alternative speciﬁcation are very similar to those in Table 8, and show a
robust eﬀect of institutions on volatility.
41rights from La Porta et al. (1998).26 These de jure measures do not appear to be related
to volatility (although the sample size is now quite small), while the coeﬃcient on initial
constraint on the executive is essentially the same as in Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 show
similar results for de jure creditors’ rights. The results are similar, but now when we
also include log initial GDP per capita (column 4), the coﬃcient on initial constraint
on the executive is no longer signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Clearly investor protec-
tion and creditors’ rights are closely linked to overall property rights enforcement and
constraint on the executive. Nevertheless, they capture only one dimension of “institu-
tional” diﬀerences, which we believe are much broader, and include various other aspects
of the organization of society. These results therefore suggest that what is important for
volatility (and more generally, for economic performance) is not simply de jure investor
or creditor protection, but a broader range of institutions, including property rights
protection for a broader cross-section of society, constraints on politicians and elites,
arrangements to manage social divisions and ensure political stability, and the “rule of
law”, which determine whether these de jure rights are enforced.27
C o l u m n s5a n d6a d dt h es h a r eo fp r i m a r ye x p o r t si nG D P ,ab a s i cm e a s u r eo f
openness and exposure to shocks, from Sachs and Warner (1997). This variable also has
little eﬀect on our main results. Similarly, including latitude, as a common proxy for
geographic inﬂuences on economic outcomes, has little impact on initial constraint on
the executive, and latitude itself is insigniﬁcant (see columns 7 and 8).
Panel B further checks our results by limiting the sample of countries under consid-
eration. Columns 9 and 10 report regressions using only Common Law countries, i.e.,
those that inherited or adopted a legal system based on British common law (see La
Porta et al., 1998). Columns 11 and 12 run the regressions just for former colonies, and
26We refer to these as “de jure” measures, since these measures do not take into account how well
these legislated rights are enforced. Note also that these measures are only available for countries that
are relatively open to capital ﬂows. For example, we do not have this information for many African
countries.
27La Porta et al (1998) also suggest that eﬀective investor protection must be enforced through courts
or regulation, and Johnson et al (2000) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for the rule of law both directly and in
interaction with de jure investor protection measures.
42drop the “Neo-Europes” (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). The results for
these various subsamples are similar to our baseline results.
One concern with our basic results is whether they simply reﬂect very large crises and
volatility in African or other poor nations which also have weak institutions. If this were
the case, one might think that institutions matter for diﬀerences in volatility between
poor (African) and rich (non-African) nations, but have less eﬀect on volatility among
richer (non-African) nations. The results so far show that there is a strong relationship
between the historically-determined component of institutions and volatility even among
nations above median world income (see Tables 1 through 7). Moreover, Table 1 showed
that even excluding Africa, there is a statistical relationship between the historically-
determined component of institutions and the level of income or economic growth. To
investigate this issue further in the context of volatility, columns 13 and 14 drop all
the African countries. The coeﬃcient on initial constraint on the executive remains
signiﬁcant and similar in size to our baseline result in Table 3. This, together with the
results reported so far, suggests that our results are not driven simply by the contrast
between poor and rich nations, and institutional diﬀerences even among relatively rich
nations matter for volatility. Finally, columns 15 and 16 report results just for countries
below the median world per capita income level, where we ﬁnd a similar relationship,
suggesting that the link between institutions and volatility is there both among relatively
poor and relatively rich nations.
Another dimension of robustness is whether the relationship between institutions
and instability is being driven by events in some speciﬁc decades. To investigate this
issue, Table 10 looks at the relationship between our measure of institutions (which
refers to the average constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970), and the
three macro outcomes of interest, in each of the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
The three panels refer to the three decades, while pairs of columns look at diﬀerent
outcomes, and columns are paired with and without initial income. The results show a
signiﬁcant relationship between institutions and volatility, and also between institutions
43and crises in the 1970s and 1980s. These relationships are weaker in the 1990s. In
contrast, the relationship between institutions and growth is stronger and signiﬁcant
in the 1990s (as well as in the 1980s, but not in the 1970s). A possible interpretation
is that during the 1990s, countries with weak institutions did not experience much
growth, and therefore had no signiﬁcant volatility.28 This interpretation highlights that
countries with weak institutions may go through extended periods (as long as a decade)
of reasonably high growth, but this growth experience is often associated with high
volatility. These countries may also experience long episodes of very low growth (and
by implication, little volatility) as seems to have been the case during the 1990s.
7.2 Proximate Mechanisms: Global Shocks, Institutions and Volatility
What is the link between institutions and volatility? There are many levels at which we
can try to answer this question. At the simplest level, we can investigate whether the
relationship occurs because countries with weaker institutions suﬀer much more in the
face of economic shocks.
More speciﬁcally, we can imagine each country going through output ﬂuctuations
due to “fundamental reasons”. We may then conjecture that when output is low in
an institutionally-weak society, there will be increased conﬂict and signiﬁcant forces
reducing output further. Therefore, output may drop by much more than it would have
done due to the underlying fundamental reasons. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test
for this possibility, since we do not observe the “fundamental” output ﬂuctuations.
However, we can investigate whether institutionally-weak societies suﬀer more volatil-
ity and larger output drops during periods of world economic slowdown and recession.
This link between world output shocks and economic problems and institutionally-weak
societies is very similar to Rodrik’s (1999) interpretation of why growth slowed down
more in some countries.
28Note, however, that our data on volatility are only through 1997, so our results do not include the
“Asian ﬁnancial crisis” of 1997-98.
44The results already presented in Table 10 suggest that the link between global shocks
and instability may not be very strong. The early 1990s were a period of disappointing
output growth, but the relationship between institutions and volatility is weak in the
1990s.




c,t−1,t · α + β · Ic,t=0 + η · gt,t−1 · Ic,t=0 + θ · lnyc,t−1 + δt−1,t + εc,t−1,t, (4)
w h e r ea l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa r ed e ﬁn e da sb e f o r e ,a n di np a r t i c u l a r ,Xc,t−1,t refers to macro
outcomes between time t−1a n dt, and here time periods are taken to be ﬁve-year periods.
The δt−1,t terms denote time eﬀects, and Ic,t=0 is our measure of initial institutions.
The variable of interest here is the interaction term between the world growth rate,
gt,t−1, and country institutions. A signiﬁcant eﬀect from these interaction terms would in-
dicate that institutionally-weak societies have a greater propensity to experience macro-
economic problems (high volatility or low growth) during periods of slow world growth.
As before we instrument for institutions, Ic,t=0, using our historical instruments, and now
we also instrument for the interaction between institutions and world aggregates, the
gt,t−1·Ic,t=0 terms, using interactions between world aggregates and our instruments. The
variables are de-meaned, so the main eﬀect of institutions in this regression is evaluated
at the mean value of the sample. We also cluster the standard errors by country.
As an alternative speciﬁcation we estimate:
Xc,t−1,t = Q
0
c,t−1,t · α + η · gt,t−1 · Ic,t=0 + θ · lnyc,t−1 + dc + δt−1,t + εc,t−1,t, (5)
which replaces the main eﬀect of institutions by a full set of country dummies.
Table 11 focuses on two global variables: the growth rate of world output and of
world trade. The results show no evidence that there is a signiﬁcant interaction term
indicating greater propensity of institutionally-weak societies to run into crises during
periods of world economic slowdown (or expansion) or greater growth of world trade.
45The interaction terms are usually insigniﬁcant when the dependent variable is volatility
of output. In contrast, in columns 5 and 6 where the dependent variable is country
growth, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant interactions between world growth and initial institutions.
This suggests that when the world economy slows down, institutionally-weak societies
slow down more than others. But these growth eﬀects do not translate into greater
volatility for these institutionally-weak societies during periods of world economic slow-
down (columns 1, 2, 3 and 4).
We conclude that the proximate mechanism for the relationship between institutions
and volatility is not primarily the propensity of institutionally-weak societies to run
into crises during periods of world recession or other major global events. Instead it
is likely that it is the inability of institutionally-weak societies to deal with their own
idiosyncratic economic and most likely political problems that underlies their economic
instability. In the next subsection, we brieﬂyl o o ka tap o t e n t i a lm e c h a n i s ma l o n gt h e s e
lines.
7.3 State Failures and Volatility
This subsection provides a preliminary investigation of whether political crises could
be a mediating mechanism for the impact of weak institutions on economic volatility,
as suggested by some of the theoretical ideas in subsection 3.1. We believe that the
link between political crises (state failures) and economic instability is important to
understand the relationship between institutions and volatility. A more in-depth study,
using more detailed measures of political crises, is necessary, but beyond the scope of
the current paper. We leave this for future research.
H e r ew es i m p l yu s et h ed a t a s e to ft h eS t a t eF a i l u r eT a s kF o r c e( 1 9 9 8 )t oc o d ep e r i o d s
of “state failures”, that is, major political crises, such as civil wars, revolutions, violent
inﬁghting, etc., between diﬀerent factions. In Panel A of Table 12, we ﬁrst look at
the relationship between state failures (in various periods) and initial constraint on the
executive, instrumented by our historical variables. Countries with weak institutions at
46t h eb e g i n n i n go ft h es a m p l ew e r em o r el i k e l yt os u ﬀer state failures, though, somewhat
surprisingly, this eﬀect is not always statistically signiﬁcant.
We next turn to the relationship between state failures and volatility or growth.
More speciﬁcally, we estimate models similar to equations (1) and (2), with the only
diﬀerence that instead of the macroeconomic variables, Q, we include a dummy for state
failure during the period, S.
The results from this exercise are reported in Panels B and C of Table 12. In the
cross-section, state failures have the right sign, but are not signiﬁcant determinants of
volatility and growth (but they are almost signiﬁcant for the severity of crises, i.e., worst
output drop). We conjecture that this may be because a dummy for state failure is too
crude to capture the severity of various political problems, while also leaving out some
important political crises that may matter for economic instability.
In any case, when we look at the 5-year observations in Panel C, we ﬁnd that state fail-
ures are now typically signiﬁcant determinants of macroeconomic problems and volatility.
Although state failures are signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient on initial institutions is reduced
only a little. This suggests that the major state failures identiﬁed in this dataset are not
the main channel leading to volatility. One possibility is that these state failures may be
“the tip of a much larger iceberg”, and there may be other less violent or less notable po-
litical crises that lead to episodes of volatility and low growth. Future work using more
detailed measures of political crises is necessary to further investigate whether more
general political crises could be a major mediating channel for the eﬀect of institutions
on economic volatility.
8C o n c l u s i o n
W h yh a v em a n yL D C ss u ﬀered very high volatility and severe crises over the postwar
period? The standard answer is that they have followed unsustainable and distortionary
macroeconomic policies. In this paper, we developed the argument that the funda-
mental cause of post-war instability is institutional. Using the historically-determined
47component of institutions, we documented a strong relationship between institutions and
volatility (as well as a link between institutions and crises or growth). Once we take the
eﬀect of institutions on volatility into account, there seems to be little major role for the
standard macroeconomic variables emphasized in the literature and by the Washington
consensus. The only “macro” variable which appears to play an important mediating
role is overvaluation of the real exchange rate, which is consistent with our discussion of
the Ghanaian case, where real overvaluation was used as a method of expropropriation
or redistribution.
Overall, we interpret our ﬁndings as suggesting that the major causes of the large
cross-country diﬀerences in volatility are institutional, and none of the standard macro-
economic variables appear to be the primary mediating channels through which institu-
tional causes lead to economic instability. These macroeconomic problems, just like the
volatility and the disappointing macroeconomic performance suﬀered by these countries,
are symptoms of deeper institutional causes.
This perspective does not suggest that macroeconomic policies do not matter. The
point we believe and want to emphasize is that there are deeper institutional causes lead-
ing to economic instability, and these institutional causes lead to bad macroeconomic
outcomes via a variety of mediating channels. Distortionary macroeconomic policies are
part of these channels, or in other words, they are part of the “tools” that groups in
power use in order to enrich themselves and to remain in power. But they are only
one of many possible tools, and a variety of complex factors, which we do not currently
understand, determine which of these tools get used in various circumstances. An in-
teresting possibility implied by this perspective is a seesaw eﬀect: preventing the use of
as p e c i ﬁc macro distortion will not necessarily cure the economic instability problems,
since underlying institutional problems may manifest themselves in the use of some other
tools by politicians and elites to achieve their objectives.
Our results also did not speciﬁcally pinpoint the exact mechanism via which insti-
tutional weaknesses translate into economic instability. They are consistent with the
48notion that political crises (“state failures”) may be important, but our evidence here is
more circumstantial. More research on these issues is clearly necessary.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Protection Against  0.96 0.50 0.56
  Expropriation, 1985-95 (0.17) (0.08) (0.10)
Initial Constraint on Executive 0.62 0.46 0.57
(0.11) (0.16) (0.18)
Log settler mortality -0.58 -1.10 -1.21 -0.91 -1.15 -1.25
(0.13) (0.26) (0.24) (0.16) (0.36) (0.35)
R-Squared 0.24 0.44 0.41 0.34 0.33 0.29















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Initial Constraint on Executive 0.75 0.50 0.50 1.57 0.98 1.05
(0.22) (0.32) (0.31) (0.71) (0.60) (0.58)
Log GDP per capita in 1970 -1.58 -2.04 -1.42
(1.00) (2.46) (0.81)
Log settler mortality -0.95 -1.35 -1.31 -0.54 -0.97 -0.98
(0.16) (0.32) (0.35) (0.20) (0.35) (0.40)
Log GDP per capita in 1970 0.84 1.21 0.63
(0.27) (0.56) (0.39)
R-Squared 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.45 0.53 0.35
Number of Observations 63 25 35 61 25 34
First Stage for Measure of Institutions
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per country.  In Panel A the 
dependent variable is the level of log GDP per capita in 1995 and in Panel B it is the average annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita from 1970 to 1997; both are from the World Bank.  The independent variable in columns 1, 2 and 3 of 
Panel A is average protection against expropriation risk, 1985-95, from Political Risk Services, as used in Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001); a higher score indicates more protection.  In all other columns the independent variable, 
Initial Constraint on Executive, is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the 
Polity score in each year; countries that are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1. In both panels 
the measure of institutions is instrumented using log settler mortality before 1850 (where mortality is per 1000 per 
annum with replacement).  
The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) report data.  Alternative samples are excolonies above median world per capita income in 1970, as measured by 
Summers-Heston and reported in Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon, and excolonies without any African 
countries.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Panel B: Dependent variable is average annual growth of GDP per capita, 1970-97
Two-Stage Least Squares
First Stage for Measure of Institutions
Two-Stage Least Squares
Panel A: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995Table 2





























Initial Constraint on Executive -0.012 -0.009 -0.061 -0.199 -7.66 -1.99
(0.0041) (0.076) (0.09) (0.18) (2.29) (2.93)
R-Squared 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.03





















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Initial Constraint on Executive -0.56 -0.62 -0.50 -0.55 -1.36 -1.38 -1.03 -0.96
(0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.41) (0.52) (0.64) (0.82)
Log Initial GDP per capita 0.21 0.28 0.06 -0.33
(0.32) (0.56) (1.12) (2.58)
R-Squared 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.11





























Initial Constraint on Executive -0.018 -0.014 -0.085 -0.640 -13.84 -2.98
(0.0071) (0.012) (0.16) (0.33) (4.00) (4.82)





















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Initial Constraint on Executive -0.83 -1.56 -0.88 -1.34 -2.46 -4.71 -2.93 -4.66
(0.20) (0.58) (0.26) (0.55) (0.73) (2.06) (1.23) (2.53)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.44 1.78 4.42 6.71
(0.83) (1.21) (2.94) (5.62)
Number of Observations 61 61 24 24 61 61 24 24
Standard Deviation GDP per capita Growth, 1970-97 Largest Output Drop, 1970-97
Panel A: OLS regressions
Panel B: Instrumenting for institutions
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; 
countries that are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In both panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality 
(where mortality is per 1000 with replacement).  The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is excolonies above median world per capita income in 1970, using the Summers-
Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In the first part of each panel the 
dependent variables are measures of macroeconomic policy.  Log average inflation is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index 
from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank.  Government Consumption is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real 
GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro and Lee (1993).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate 
during 1960-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In the second part of both panels, the dependent 
variables are the standard deviation of the average annual growth rate of GDP from 1970 to 1997, and the lowest annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
from 1970 to 1997 (with the sign changed so that an output fall is a positive number); both are from the World Bank.




Dependent variable is:Table 3























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Government Consumption 8.09 8.09 4.90 3.30 4.18 0.63 1.52 -5.13 -3.81
(2.83) (3.81) (6.89) (3.54) (3.92) (4.11) (4.84) (5.19) (6.23)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.52 -0.46 -0.82 -0.86 -0.92 -0.94
(0.12) (0.14) (0.23) (0.28) (0.25) (0.32)
R-Squared 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.29 0.40
Number of Observations 96 61 25 61 24 61 24 60 24
Panel B: 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Government Consumption 2.89 5.57 1.48 4.70 5.30 3.35 5.03 -1.29 -1.92
(2.94) (4.25) (7.31) (3.77) (4.15) (5.01) (5.81) (6.48) (7.28)
Log Initial GDP per capita -0.82 -0.41 -1.06 0.36 0.51 1.56 1.95 1.46 1.72
(0.21) (0.32) (0.84) (0.34) (0.58) (0.83) (1.22) (0.87) (1.26)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.61 -0.55 -1.56 -1.31 -1.59 -1.35
(0.15) (0.18) (0.83) (0.54) (0.59) (0.58)
R-Squared 0.21 0.10 0.08
Number of Observations 96 61 25 61 24 61 24 60 24
Panel C: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Government Consumption 4.53 5.27 1.39 2.22 0.13 -1.82 -1.78
(2.31) (3.48) (2.76) (3.82) (3.24) (4.19) (4.71)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.39 -0.23 -0.91 -0.57
(0.14) (0.12) (0.27) (0.32)
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06
Number of Countries 95 61 24 61 24 61 24
Panel D: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Government Consumption -2.07 -2.58 -2.87 2.04 -2.76 0.74 -1.86
(2.61) (3.49) (5.29) (3.48) (5.48) (4.41) (6.20)
Lagged Log GNP per capita -0.68 -0.35 -0.73 -0.04 -0.65 0.71 -0.03
(0.13) (0.23) (0.45) (0.33) (0.58) (0.58) (0.79)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.40 -0.06 -1.35 -0.56
(0.20) (0.15) (0.56) (0.48)
R-Squared 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09
Number of Countries 94 60 24 60 24 60 24
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that 
are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 
with replacement).  Whole World is the set of countries for which we have data on the outcome and the macroeconomic variable.  The Excolonies Sample includes 
all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is excolonies above median world 
income (and without Gabon) in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993).  For more detailed data definitions and sources see 
Appendix Table 1.
Dependent Variable is standard deviation of Growth Rate of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panels A and B are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country; Panels C and D are "5-year" unbalanced panels 
(1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-1997) with up to 6 observations per country.  Panels C and D include time dummies but not country dummies;
we cluster the errors by country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate over either the whole period (Panels A and 
B) or the relevant "5-year" subperiod (Panels C and D).  Government Consumption is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real 
GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro and Lee (1993).  For Panels A and B, in columns 8 and 9, government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., 
government consumption 1960-69 for government consumption 1970-89).  In Panel B log initial GDP per capita is the Summers-Heston estimate for 1970, from 
Barro and Lee (1993).  In Panel D lagged log GNP per capita is at the start of each "5-year" period (1970 for 1970-75, etc); using GNP rather than GDP increases 
our sample size.  
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions Just macro variables
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Macro and Institutions; not 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Average Inflation 0.30 0.12 0.51 0.11 0.41 0.10 0.34 -0.14 0.42
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.42) (0.35)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.56 -0.42 -0.83 -0.66 -0.86 -0.62
(0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.34)
R-Squared 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.29 0.55
Number of Observations 96 61 24 61 24 61 24 48 19
Log Average Inflation 0.21 0.17 0.48 0.09 0.41 -0.04 0.33 -0.07 0.25
(0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.48) (0.48)
Log Initial GDP per capita -0.88 -0.63 -0.55 0.19 0.33 1.47 1.29 1.25 1.35
(0.19) (0.29) (0.46) (0.32) (0.48) (0.88) (0.96) (0.74) (1.01)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.62 -0.48 -1.57 -1.00 -1.45 -1.06
(0.15) (0.16) (0.61) (0.45) (0.51) (0.63)
R-Squared 0.22 0.08 0.35 0.29 0.56
Number of Observations 96 61 24 61 24 61 24 48 19
Log Average Inflation 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.13 0.27 0.11 0.22
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.40 -0.27 -0.64 -0.47
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.16)
R-Squared 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.23
Number of Countries 96 61 24 61 24 61 24
Log Average Inflation 0.16 0.17 0.28 0.057 0.27 0.19 0.25
(0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)
Lagged Log GNP per capita -0.48 -0.30 -0.28 0.18 -0.01 0.54 0.52
(0.09) (0.16) (0.20) (0.11) (0.19) (0.40) (0.45)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.43 -0.26 -1.04 -0.78
(0.13) (0.072) (0.40) (0.37)
R-Squared 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.23
Number of Countries 96 61 24 61 24 61 24
Dependent Variable is standard deviation of Growth Rate of real GDP per capita, 1970-1997
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panels A and B are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country; Panels C and D are "5-year" unbalanced panels 
(1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-1997) with up to 6 observations per country.  Panels C and D include time dummies but not country dummies; 
we cluster the errors by country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate over either the whole period (Panels A and B) 
or the relevant "5-year" subperiod (Panels C and D).  In Panels A and B log average inflation is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 
1970 to 1997, from the World Bank; in Panels B and C we use the "5-year" subperiod values of the same variable.  In Panels A and B, columns 8 and 9, log average 
inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average inflation over 1960-69).  In Panel B log initial GDP per capita is the Summers-Heston estimate for 
1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).  In Panel D lagged log GNP per capita is at the start of each "5-year" period (1970 for 1970-75, etc); using GNP rather than GDP 
increases our sample size.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions Just macro variables
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Macro and Institutions; not 
instrumenting for institutions
Panel A: 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Panel B: 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Panel C: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Panel D: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that are 
still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 with 
replacement).  Whole World is the set of countries for which we have data on the outcome and the macroeconomic variable.  The Excolonies Sample includes all 
former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is excolonies above median world per 
capita income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see 
Appendix Table 1.Table 5






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.025 0.028 0.031 0.020 0.024 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.058
(0.0060) (0.0059) (0.016) (0.006) (0.013) (0.0078) (0.016) (0.03) (0.05)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.30 -0.49 -0.49 -0.88 -0.62 -0.82
(0.10) (0.15) (0.21) (0.31) (0.44) (0.38)
R-Squared 0.19 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.51
Number of Observations 73 44 18 44 18 44 18 32 16
Panel B: 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.019 0.026 0.032 0.021 0.023 0.012 0.013 0.027 0.058
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.028) (0.057)
Log Initial GDP per capita -0.71 -0.15 -0.54 0.26 0.18 0.93 1.09 1.07 0.94
(0.17) (0.23) (0.59) (0.25) (0.54) (0.62) (0.98) (0.71) (1.15)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.37 -0.51 -0.98 -1.16 -0.85 -1.08
(0.12) (0.18) (0.51) (0.51) (0.63) (0.62)
R-Squared 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.48 0.52
Number of Observations 73 44 18 44 18 44 18 32 16
Panel C: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial income
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.0080 0.012
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0034) (0.0064)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.24 -0.33 -0.360 -0.550
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17)
R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.34
Number of Countries 73 44 18 44 18 44 18
Panel D: 5-year panels, 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.012
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0035) (0.0057)
Lagged Log GNP per capita -0.43 -0.19 -0.48 -0.01 -0.23 0.17 0.0025
(0.07) (0.11) (0.24) (0.11) (0.22) (0.26) (0.40)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.24 -0.28 -0.49 -0.55
(0.09) (0.09) (0.30) (0.33)
R-Squared 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.35
Number of Countries 73 44 18 44 18 44 18
Dependent Variable is standard deviation of Growth Rate of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panels A and B are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.   Panels C and D are "5-year" unbalanced panels 
(1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-1997) with up to 6 observations per country.  Panels C and D include time dummies but not country dummies; 
we cluster the errors by country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate over either the whole period (Panels A and B) 
or the relevant "5-year" subperiod (Panels C and D).  In Panels A and B, Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange 
rate, 1970-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) applying the methodology of Dollar (1992); in Panels C and D we use the "5-year" period values of the same 
variable.  In columns 8 and 9 of Panels A and B we instrument overvaluation 1970-98 using its lagged value 1960-69.  In Panel B log initial GDP per capita is the 
Summers-Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).  In Panel D lagged log GNP per capita is at the start of each "5-year" period (1970 for 1970-75, etc); 
using GNP rather than GDP increases our sample size.
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that are 
still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 with 
replacement).  Whole World is the set of countries for which we have data on the outcome and the macroeconomic variable.  The Excolonies Sample includes all 
former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is excolonies above median world income 
in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; not 
instrumenting for institutions Just macro variablesTable 6






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variable is Government Consumption
Government Consumption 2.29 8.75 -16.60 -23.99 10.67 22.17 -6.04 -17.26
(14.67) (22.54) (18.51) (30.13) (17.74) (27.06) (22.30) (34.60)
Log Initial GDP per capita 4.78 7.46 4.00 6.12
(2.93) (5.67) (2.99) (5.96)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -2.42 -2.81 -2.74 -3.27 -4.71 -4.54 -4.58 -4.76
(0.83) (1.32) (0.88) (1.54) (2.08) (2.51) (2.03) (2.75)
Number of Observations 61 24 60 24 61 24 60 24
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variable is Log Average Inflation
Log Average Inflation 0.75 1.35 -0.78 -0.45 0.37 1.31 -0.62 -0.31
(0.60) (0.78) (1.37) (1.38) (0.80) (0.92) (1.70) (2.05)
Log Initial GDP per capita 4.21 4.78 4.30 5.18
(3.06) (4.69) (2.61) (4.37)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -2.45 -2.07 -2.71 -2.34 -4.59 -3.32 -4.84 -4.15
(0.73) (1.11) (0.70) (1.34) (2.12) (2.20) (1.80) (2.72)
Number of Observations 61 24 49 20 61 24 48 19
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variable is Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.0056 0.056 0.028 0.22 -0.011 0.036 0.09 0.22
(0.032) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18) (0.053) (0.077) (0.10) (0.21)
Log Initial GDP per capita 5.04 3.87 4.72 3.46
(3.11) (3.77) (2.64) (4.13)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -2.17 -2.68 -1.98 -2.51 -4.86 -3.68 -2.98 -3.47
(0.86) (1.16) (1.59) (1.32) (2.56) (1.96) (2.34) (2.23)
Number of Observations 44 18 32 16 44 18 32 16
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; 
countries that are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where
mortality is per 1000 with replacement).  The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is excolonies above median world income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from 
Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All Panels are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is 
the lowest annual growth rate of GDP per capita from 1970 to 1997 (with the sign changed so that an output fall is a positive number), from the World 
Bank.  Log average inflation (in Panel A) is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank.  
In columns 3, 4, 7 and 8, log average inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average inflation over 1960-69).  
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Cross-section, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial 
income Cross-section, 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Dependent Variable is largest annual drop in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Government Consumption (Panel B) is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from 
Barro-Lee.  In columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., government consumption 1960-69 for 
government consumption 1970-89).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel C) is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 
1960-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, the real exchange rate 
overvaluation measure is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., real overvaluation 1960-69 for real overvaluation 1970-98).  Log initial GDP per 
capita is the Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).Table 7





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variable is Government Consumption
Government Consumption -0.23 -2.11 0.038 3.64 -3.19 -6.90 -4.31 1.00
(4.58) (7.03) (5.51) (8.86) (6.07) (8.57) (7.55) (10.56)
Log Initial GDP per capita -1.68 -2.67 -1.65 -2.40
(1.00) (1.80) (1.01) (1.82)
Initial Constraint on the Executive 0.76 0.58 0.76 0.66 1.57 1.20 1.53 1.24
(0.26) (0.41) (0.26) (0.45) (0.71) (0.80) (0.69) (0.84)
Number of Observations 61 24 60 24 61 24 60 24
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variable is Log Average Inflation
Log Average Inflation -0.36 -0.34 0.21 -0.09 -0.23 -0.30 0.15 0.20
(0.18) (0.23) (0.47) (0.56) (0.27) (0.31) (0.57) (0.86)
Log Initial GDP per capita -1.45 -1.99 -1.24 -2.18
(1.02) (1.59) (0.87) (1.83)
Initial Constraint on the Executive 0.76 0.34 0.73 0.46 1.50 0.93 1.32 1.17
(0.22) (0.29) (0.24) (0.54) (0.71) (0.75) (0.60) (1.14)
Number of Observations 61 25 49 49 61 24 48 19
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variable is Overvaluaton of Real Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation -0.049 -0.018 0.013 0.0072 0.0010 -0.007 -0.0052 0.0094
(0.012) (0.025) (0.041) (0.082) (0.020) (0.033) (0.038) (0.105)
Log Initial GDP per capita -1.79 -2.09 -1.38 -2.49
(1.17) (1.62) (0.96) (2.10)
Initial Constraint on the Executive 0.64 0.46 0.66 0.56 1.60 1.00 0.96 1.25
(0.33) (0.49) (0.66) (0.61) (0.96) (0.84) (0.85) (1.13)
Number of Observations 44 18 32 16 44 18 32 16
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that 
are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all regressions we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 
with replacement). The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The 
alternative sample is excolonies above median world income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For 
more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All Panels are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is the average 
annual GDP per capita growth rate over 1970-97.  Log average inflation (in Panel A) is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 
1997, from the World Bank.  In columns 3, 4, 7 and 8, log average inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average inflation over 1960-69). 
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Cross-section, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial 
income Cross-section, 1970-1997, controlling for initial income
Dependent Variable is Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita, 1970-97
Government Consumption (Panel B) is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro-Lee.  In 
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., government consumption 1960-69 for government consumption 1970-
89).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel C) is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 1960-97, constructed by Easterly and Levine 
(2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, real overvaluation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., real overvaluation 1960-69 
for real overvaluation 1970-98).  Log initial GDP per capita is the Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro-Lee.Table 8
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Standard 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.48 -1.29 -1.54 -1.94 -0.77 -1.59 -0.74 -1.30 -0.71 -1.41
(0.21) (0.84) (1.24) (1.57) (0.33) (0.88) (0.22) (0.63) (0.17) (0.57)
Log Initial GDP per capita -1.63 0.94 0.08 1.04 1.35
(1.25) (0.77) (1.19) (0.85) (0.82)
p-value for macro variables [0.25] [0.17]
Average Years of Schooling in 1970 0.60 0.55
(0.72) (0.87)
Log Average Money/GDP Ratio -0.21 1.46
(0.84) (0.99)
p-value for terms of trade variables [0.006] [0.18]
Number of Observations 44 44 47 47 61 61 60 60 59 59
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.88 -1.26 -1.54 -1.38 -0.65 -1.04 -0.87 -1.24 -0.58 -0.86
(0.30) (0.55) (1.09) (0.86) (0.20) (0.48) (0.22) (0.50) (0.13) (0.43)
Lagged log GNP per capita 0.71 -0.22 0.54 0.55 0.28
(0.58) (0.44) (0.41) (0.50) (0.25)
p-value for macro variables [0.99] [0.69]
Average Years of Schooling 0.61 0.61
(0.57) (0.54)
Log Average Money/GDP Ratio -0.07 -0.11
(0.44) (0.51)
Terms of trade shock 28.88 19.08
  x export/GDP share (25.07) (21.96)
Number of Countries 58 58 47 47 61 61 60 60 59 59
Columns 1 and 2 include: log average inflation, which is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997 (Panel A) and the log of average annual CPI 
inflation in each "5-year" period (Panel B), from the World Bank; and Government Consumption, which is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real 
GDP from 1970 to 1989 (Panel A) and the average in each "5-year" period for which it is available (Panel B), from Barro and Lee (1993); and Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel A 
only), which is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 1970-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  Columns 3 
and 4 include average schooling years in the total population over age 25 for 1970 (Panel A) and each "5-year" period for which it is available (Panel B), from Barro and Lee (1993).
Columns 5 and 6 include the log of average money-GDP ratio for 1970-97 (Panel A) and for each "5-year" period (Panel B), from the World Bank.  Columns 7 and 8 include the interaction
of standard deviation of terms of trade shocks in 1970-89 times export-GDP ratio in 1970 (Panel A) and the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks times export-GDP ratio in each "5-
year" period (Panel B), from Barro and Lee (1993).  The main effects are included in the regressions but not reported to save space.  Columns 9 and 10 drop Rwanda and Gabon.  
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that are still colonies in a 
particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In both panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 with replacement).  All regressions use our 
Excolonies Sample which includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  For more detailed data definitions and sources 
see Appendix Table 1.
Dependent Variable is standard deviation of Growth Rate of real GDP per capita
Panel A: Cross-Section, 1970-97; instrumenting for institutions
Panel B: 5-year panels, 1970-97; instrumenting for institutions
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panel A reports cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country; Panel B reports "5-year" unbalanced panels (1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 
1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-1997) with up to 6 observations per country.  Panel B includes time dummies but not country dummies; we cluster the errors by country.  In all Panels the 
dependent variable is standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate over either the whole period (Panel A) or the relevant "5-year" subperiod (Panel B).   In Panel B log initial GDP 
per capita is the Summers-Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).  In Panel B lagged log GNP per capita is at the start of each "5-year" period (1970 for 1970-75, etc); using 
GNP rather than GDP increases our sample size.   Table 9










in GDP Latitude Latitude
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -1.18 -2.18 -0.92 -1.79 -0.82 -1.65 -0.77 -1.48
(0.49) (1.33) (0.33) (0.95) (0.21) (0.67) (0.25) (0.62)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.41 1.81 1.58 1.42
(1.18) (1.41) (0.96) (0.81)
Shareholders' Rights 0.499 0.875
(0.42) (0.83)
Creditors' Rights -0.13 0.42
(0.23) (0.56)
Share of exports of primary products 1.65 (0.09)
  in GNP in 1970 (2.40) (3.36)
Latitude 1.08 -1.43
(2.19) (2.63)

















(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.76 -1.34 -0.99 -1.77 -0.70 -1.24 -1.46 -1.03
(0.24) (0.83) (0.36) (0.83) (0.24) (0.47) (0.77) (0.77)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.11 1.40 1.41 -1.04
(1.18) (0.89) (0.64) (0.81)
Number of Observations 20 20 57 57 34 34 36 36
Columns 1 and 2 include the measure of "anti-director rights" (i.e., shareholders' rights relative to directors) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), where a higher score indicates stronger rights for shareholders.  Columns 3 and 4 include a measure of creditor rights, in which a higher score 
indicates stronger rights for creditors, from La Porta et al (1998).  Columns 5 and 6 include the share of primary exports in GDP in 1970 from Sachs and Warner 
(1997).  Columns 7 and 8 include the absolute normalized value of distance from the equator (i.e., a standardized measure of latitude), in which a higher value 
indicates that a country's capital is further from the equator.
Columns 9 and 10 include just Common Law countries (British legal origin), from La Porta et al (1998).  Columns 11 and 12 include just former European 
colonies, but drop the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  Columns 13 and 14 drop all countries in Africa.  Columns 15 and 16 include just countries 
below the median world per capita income level in 1970, using the Summers-Heston measure from Barro and Lee (1993).
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries 
that are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all regressions we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is 
per 1000 with replacement).  All regressions use our Excolonies Sample which includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001) report data.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  The dependent variable is standard deviation of real GDP per 
capita growth rate over 1970-97.   Log initial GDP per capita is the Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro-Lee.Table 10
Institutions and Economic Stability: Results by Decade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -1.06 -1.92 -1.94 -3.45 0.30 0.43
(0.37) (0.96) (0.86) (2.14) (0.30) (0.66)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.72 2.99 -0.25
(1.35) (3.02) (0.93)
Number of Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.70 -1.90 -2.01 -5.30 0.86 1.68
(0.26) (0.78) (0.71) (2.21) (0.30) (0.77)
Log Initial GDP per capita 2.30 6.30 -1.57
(1.07) (3.04) (1.06)
Number of Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.46 -0.85 -1.46 -3.13 0.81 1.63
(0.25) (0.70) (0.57) (1.90) (0.32) (1.07)
Log Initial GDP per capita 0.71 2.97 -1.47
(0.97) (2.66) (1.50)
Number of Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
"Initial Constraint on the Executive" is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the 
Polity score in each year; countries that are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all panels we 
instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 with replacement).  All regressions use 
our Excolonies Sample, including all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) report data.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Standard deviation of Growth 
Rate of real GDP per capita 
Worst Drop Output (GDP per 
capita)
Growth of Real GDP per 
capita
Dependent Variable is 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In 
columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate, from the World Bank.  In 
columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the lowest annual growth rate of GDP per capita (with the sign changed so that 
an output fall is a positive number), from the World Bank.  In columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the average annual 
GDP per capita growth rate.  In Panel A we use outcomes for 1970-79, in Panel B we use outcomes for 1980-89, and in 
Panel C we use outcomes for 1990-97.  Log initial GDP per capita is the Summers-Heston estimate for 1970 (Panel A), 
1980 (Panel B), and 1990 (Panel C), from Barro and Lee (1993).
Panel A: Cross-Section for 1970s
Panel B: Cross-Section for 1980s
Panel C: Cross-Section for 1990sTable 11
Global Shocks and Institutions: Panel Results
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.59 -0.60 0.74 0.73
(0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.23)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -15.67 -11.11 0.021 0.012 -38.66 -40.19 -0.01 -6.36
 x world economy variable (19.86) (18.63) (0.067) (0.092) (17.34) (18.79) (0.10) (47.51)
Number of Countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
Dependent Variable is:
Initial Constraint on the Executive is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that 
are still colonies in a particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In all regressions we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is 
deaths per annum per 1000 with replacement).  All regressions use our Excolonies Sample, which includes all former colonies of European Powers for which 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Standard deviation of Growth Rate of real GDP per capita 
Using World Growth as World 
Economy varaible
Using World Growth as 
World Economy varaible
Using World Trade as World 
Economy variable
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent Variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate in "5-year" periods (1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 
1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-97) in columns 1 through 4 and growth rates of GDP per capita in "5-year" periods in columns 5 through 8, both from the World Bank.  
World growth is annual change in gross domestic product, market exchange rate weighted, from the IMF website.  World trade growth is trade volume of goods 
and services, from the IMF.  Both world growth and world trade growth are annual growth rates averaged over the relevant "5-year" period.  All regressions 
include period dummies.  Odd numbered columns do not use fixed effects and cluster the errors by country.  Even numbered columns use fixed effects.
Growth of Real GDP per capita
Using World Trade as 
World Economy variableTable 12
Institutions, State Failures and Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.11 -0.058 -0.019 0.047 -0.060 -0.032 -0.072 -0.031
(0.054) (0.12) (0.050) (0.12) (0.039) (0.086) (0.039) (0.11)
Log Initial GDP per capita -0.11 -0.13 -0.050 -0.068
(0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15)
Number of Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 53 53
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.83 -1.56 -2.19 -4.56 0.73 1.54
(0.23) (0.60) (0.78) (2.06) (0.25) (0.72)
State Failure Dummy 0.003 0.07 2.36 2.58 -0.33 -0.40
(0.54) (0.67) (1.87) (2.31) (0.59) (0.81)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.45 4.71 -1.62
(0.82) (2.83) (0.98)
Number of Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61
Initial Constraint on the Executive -0.60 -1.06 -1.27 -2.32 0.66 1.05
(0.14) (0.41) (0.34) (0.81) (0.23) (0.41)
State Failure Dummy 1.24 1.25 3.88 3.89 -2.28 -2.28
(0.70) (0.73) (1.20) (1.33) (0.63) (0.67)
Lagged log GNP per capita 0.60 1.38 -0.51
(0.40) (0.78) (0.40)
Number of Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panels A and B are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  Panel C is "5-year" unbalanced panels 
(1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-1997) with up to 6 observations per country.  Panel C includes time dummies but not country 
dummies; we cluster the errors by country.  In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the country experience a "State Failure", 
i.e., a civil war, breakdown of social order, major ethnic conflict or major regime transition as defined by the State Failure Project. For Panel A, the dummy 
equals one if there was a State Failure in 1970-98 (columns 1 and 2), in 1970-79 (columns 3 and 4), in 1980-89 (columns 5 and 6), and in 1990-97 
(columns 7 and 8).  
In Panels B and C, columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate in 1970-97 (Panel B) and in each "5-year" 
period (Panel C), from the World Bank.  In Panels B and C, columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the lowest annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
(with the sign changed so that an output fall is a positive number) in 1970-97 (Panel B) and each "5-year" period (Panel C), from the World Bank.  In 
Panels B and C, columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the average annual GDP per capita growth rate in 1970-97 (Panel B) and each "5-year" period 
(Panel C).
State Failure in 1980-89 State Failure in 1990-97
Standard deviation of Growth 
Rate of real GNP per capita 
Worst Drop Output (GNP per 
capita)
Growth of Real GNP per 
capita
Log initial GDP per capita is the Summers-Heston estimate for 1970 (Panels A and B), from Barro and Lee (1993).  In Panel C lagged log GNP per capita 
is at the start of each "5-year" period (1970 for 1970-75, etc); using GNP rather than GDP increases our sample size.  "Initial Constraint on the Executive" 
is average constraint on executive in 1950, 1960 and 1970, which is an average of the Polity score in each year; countries that are still colonies in a 
particular year are assigned a score of 1.  In both panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 1000 with 
replacement).
All regressions use our Excolonies Sample which includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
report data.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1.
Panel A:  Dependent Variable is State Failure Dummy
Panel B: Cross-Section for 1970-97, dependent variable:
Panel C: 5-year Panels for 1970-97, dependent variable:
Standard deviation of Growth 
Rate of real GNP per capita 
Worst Drop Output (GNP per 
capita)
Growth of Real GNP per 
capita
State Failure in 1970-98 State Failure in 1970-79Appendix Table A1
Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 Logarithm of GDP per capita, on Purchasing Power Parity Basis, in 1995. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.  Data on Suriname is 
from the 2000 version of this same source.
Log GDP per capita in 1970 Logarithm of real GDP per capita (1980 international prices) from Summers Heston dataset v.4.0. Barro-Lee dataset, used in Barro and Lee (1993) and available from the NBER website: 
www.nber.org.
Log GDP per capita in 1980 Logarithm of real GDP per capita (1985 international prices) from Summers Heston dataset v.5.5. Barro-Lee dataset.
Log GDP per capita in 1990 Logarithm of real GDP per capita (1985 international prices) from Summers Heston dataset v.5.5. Barro-Lee dataset.
Growth Rate of GDP per capita, 1970-98 Annual GDP growth rate minus annual population growth rate. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.
Standard Deviation of Growth Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate. Calculated from the Growth Rate of GDP per capita.  From the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.
Worst Output Drop Worst annual GDP per capita growth rate.  Sign has been changed so that a negative growth rate is a positive "output drop." Calculated from the Growth Rate of GDP per capita.  From the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.
Log GNP per capita, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995
Logarithm of GNP per capita World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.  Data on Suriname is 
from the 2000 version of this same source.
Constraint on Executive in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1990 and 
intervening years.
A seven category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more constraints.  Score of 1 indicates unlimited 
authority; score of 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations; score of 5 indicates substantial limitations; score of 7 indicates 
executive parity or subordination.  Scores of 2, 4, and 6 indicate intermediate values.
Polity IV dataset, downloaded from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research.  Variable described in Gurr 1997.
Average Protection against Expropriation Risk, 1985-95 Risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score means less risk.  We 
calculated the mean value for the scores in all years from 1985 to 1995.
Dataset obtained directly from Political Risk Services, September 1999.  These data 
were previously used by Knack and Keefer (1995) and were organized in electronic 
form by the IRIS Center (University of Maryland).  The original compilers of this data 
are Political Risk Services.
Constraints on Executive in 1950, 1960, 1970, and 
1990.
A seven category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more constraints.  Score of 1 indicates unlimited 
authority; score of 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations; score of 5 indicates substantial limitations; score of 7 indicates 
execut
Polity III dataset, downloaded from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research.  Variable described in Gurr 1997.
Log Average Inflation Log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1998. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.
Government Consumption Average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989. Barro-Lee dataset.
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation An index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate in 1960-97.  Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).
Variability of Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation Standard deviation of an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate in 1976-85.  Dollar (1992).
Average Years of Schooling Average schooling years in the total population over age 25 for 1970  Barro-Lee dataset.
Money/GDP Log of average Money-GDP ratio for 1970-97 (and subperiods where specified) World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom, 1999.
Shareholders' Rights An index aggregating the shareholder rights which La Porta et al label as "anti-director rights."  The index is formed by 
adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism 
is in place; or (5) when the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary 
Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median).  The index ranges from 0 to 5.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998.
Creditors' Rights An index aggregating creditor rights.  The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors' consent or minimum dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does not retain the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization; (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the 
distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm.  The index ranges from 0 to 4.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998.
Standard deviation of terms of trade shocks Standard deviation of an index of terms of trade shock, 1970-89 (and subperiods where specified) Barro-Lee dataset.
Export/GDP Ratio of exports to GDP in 1970 (and other dates where specified) Barro-Lee dataset.
Share of primary exports in GDP Exports of commodities divided by GDP in 1970 Sachs-Warner dataset, available on the web.  Used in Sachs and Warner (1997).
State Failure Dummy equal to one if there was a civil war, breakdown of social order, major ethnic conflict or major regime transition as 
defined by the State Failure Project.
State Failure Task Force (1998)
World Growth Growth rate of World GDP  IMF (online)
World Trade Growth Growth rate of World Trade IMF (online)
Log Settler Mortality Log of estimated mortality for European settlers during the early period of European colonization (before 1850).  Settler 
mortality is calculated from the mortality rates of European-born soldiers, sailors and bishops when stationed in colonies.  It 
measures the effects of local diseases on people without inherited or acquired imm






Annual growth GDP per capita, 1970-1997 1.07 0.09 1.95
Standard Deviation of Growth (GDP per capita), 1970-1997 4.68 3.44 5.69
Worst Drop Output (GDP per capita), 1970-1997 9.03 6.05 14.23
Average Constraint on the Executive  2.33 1.5 3.67
  in 1950, 1960 and 1970
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.169 0.126 0.211
Log Average Inflation, 1970-98 2.42 2.01 3.17
Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate 117.3 91.06 145.23
Variability of Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate 0.13 0.08 0.22































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Government Consumption 1.78 2.74 -6.86 -9.20 6.50 12.01 -3.74 -10.34
(4.65) (6.88) (6.79) (12.10) (7.33) (13.68) (10.05) (20.93)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.95 4.35 1.77 3.80
(1.42) (4.52) (1.49) (4.84)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -0.86 -0.92 -0.83 -0.88 -0.99 -1.06 -1.77 -1.91 -1.87 -2.10
(0.25) (0.41) (0.28) (0.42) (0.33) (0.59) (0.99) (1.68) (1.07) (2.12)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 60 24 61 24 60 24
Log Average Inflation -0.08 0.07 -0.31 0.52 -0.47 -2.98 -0.37 0.09
(0.21) (0.39) (0.55) (0.52) (0.52) (5.71) (0.94) (2.27)
Log Initial GDP per capita 1.73 4.05 2.03 6.09 2.23 6.61
(1.38) (4.56) (1.71) (12.87) (1.95) (16.63)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -1.77 -2.01 -0.86 -0.87 -1.03 -0.75 -1.94 -2.98 -2.17 -3.19
(0.98) (1.81) (0.26) (0.54) (0.34) (0.68) (1.19) (5.71) (1.41) (7.94)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 49 20 61 24 48 19
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.0075 -0.020 0.009 0.05 -0.020 -0.280 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.078) (1.236) (0.04) (0.53)
Log Initial GDP per capita 2.35 15.60 1.58 14.05
(4.11) (63.22) (1.44) (67.11)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -0.68 -1.31 -0.64 -1.16 -2.44 -7.29 -0.99 -6.68
(0.41) (1.02) (0.56) (1.08) (3.93) (28.43) (1.02) (30.44)
Number of Observations 44 18 32 16 44 18 32 16
"Constraint on the Executive in 1970" is constraint on executive in 1970 from the Polity dataset.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is per 
1000 with replacement).  The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative sample is 
excolonies above median world income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and sources see 
Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All Panels are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is the volatility of annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank.  Log average inflation (in Panel A) is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997, from the 
World Bank.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, log average inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average inflation over 1960-69).  
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variable is Government Consumption
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variable is Log Average Inflation
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variable is Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate
Cross-section, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial 
income
Cross-section, 1970-1997, controlling for initial 
income
Dependent Variable is standard deviation of growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Government Consumption (Panel B) is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro-Lee.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, 
government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., government consumption 1960-69 for government consumption 1970-89).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel C) 
is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 1960-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, 
the real exchange rate overvaluation measure is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., real overvaluation 1960-69 for real overvaluation 1970-98).  Log initial GDP per capita is the 
Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).
Institutions only
Cross-section, 1970-1997Table A4



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Government Consumption 2.29 8.75 -21.75 -42.87 20.18 46.31 -3.09 -46.90
(14.67) (22.54) (23.14) (49.10) (24.12) (51.41) (31.97) (80.32)
Log Initial GDP per capita 5.96 15.77 4.90 13.44
(4.68) (16.98) (4.74) (18.57)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -2.56 -3.06 -2.42 -2.81 -2.95 -3.69 -5.35 -6.62 -5.38 -7.38
(0.87) (1.61) (0.83) (1.32) (1.13) (2.41) (3.24) (6.32) (3.39) (8.14)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 60 24 61 24 60 24
Log Average Inflation 0.24 0.49 -1.38 0.79 -0.90 -1.92 -1.60 -0.91
(0.72) (1.47) (1.78) (1.82) (1.67) (7.97) (3.20) (8.78)
Log Initial GDP per capita 5.28 14.61 5.86 20.74 7.57 25.70
(4.54) (17.17) (5.50) (45.29) (6.64) (64.21)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -5.35 -7.00 -2.56 -2.73 -3.30 -2.90 -5.67 -9.92 -7.26 -12.45
(3.24) (6.82) (0.88) (2.07) (1.10) (2.39) (3.82) (20.10) (4.81) (30.66)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 49 20 61 24 48 19
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation -0.028 -0.064 0.017 0.21 -0.17 -0.897 0.09 0.10
(0.06) (0.16) (0.12) (0.31) (0.39) (3.910) (0.13) (1.66)
Log Initial GDP per capita 12.08 49.77 6.50 45.43
(20.40) (200.22) (4.95) (212.81)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 -3.03 -3.98 -2.04 -3.55 -12.07 -23.06 -3.46 -21.38
(1.72) (3.12) (1.82) (3.26) (19.52) (90.04) (3.48) (96.54)
Number of Observations 44 18 32 16 44 18 32 16
Cross-section, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial 
income
Cross-section, 1970-1997, controlling for initial 
income
Dependent Variable is largest annual drop in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Government Consumption (Panel B) is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro-Lee.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, 
government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., government consumption 1960-69 for government consumption 1970-89).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel 
C) is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 1960-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In columns 5, 6, 9 
and 10, the real exchange rate overvaluation measure is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., real overvaluation 1960-69 for real overvaluation 1970-98).  Log initial GDP per capita is 
the Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).
Institutions only
Cross-section, 1970-1997
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variable is Government Consumption
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variable is Log Average Inflation
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variable is Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate
"Constraint on the Executive in 1970" is constraint on executive in 1970 from the Polity dataset.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is 
per 1000 with replacement).  The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative 
sample is excolonies above median world income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and 
sources see Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All Panels are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is the lowest annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita from 1970 to 1997 (with the sign changed so that an output fall is a positive number), from the World Bank.  Log average inflation (in Panel A) is the log of average annual 
inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, log average inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average 
inflation over 1960-69).  
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both Table A5



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Government Consumption -1.31 -2.93 1.45 7.44 -6.35 -13.27 -1.97 8.74
(5.06) (7.86) (6.86) (13.03) (8.31) (15.19) (10.87) (22.70)
Log Initial GDP per capita -2.08 -4.86 -1.95 -4.31
(1.61) (5.02) (1.61) (5.25)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 0.80 0.63 0.77 0.59 0.82 0.74 1.78 1.75 1.79 1.93
(0.28) (0.47) (0.30) (0.48) (0.33) (0.64) (1.12) (1.87) (1.15) (2.30)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 60 24 61 24 60 24
Log Average Inflation -0.20 -0.15 0.37 -0.16 0.19 0.60 0.42 0.37
(0.23) (0.42) (0.60) (0.63) (0.57) (2.39) (0.99) (2.75)
Log Initial GDP per capita -1.86 -4.53 -1.98 -6.46 -2.13 -7.98
(1.56) (5.06) (1.87) (13.58) (2.05) (20.08)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 1.78 1.85 0.79 0.54 0.89 0.57 1.85 2.78 1.98 3.52
(1.11) (2.01) (0.28) (0.60) (0.37) (0.83) (1.30) (6.03) (1.48) (9.58)
Number of Observations 61 24 61 24 49 20 61 24 48 19
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.0051 0.0029 0.017 0.01 0.053 0.250 -0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (1.05) (0.130) (1.130) (0.05) (0.62)
Log Initial GDP per capita -4.11 -14.52 -1.95 -17.60
(7.00) (57.67) (1.74) (79.21)
Constraint on the Executive in 1970 0.89 0.68 0.68 0.79 3.96 6.24 1.11 7.70
(0.61) (0.94) (0.75) (1.10) (6.69) (25.93) (1.23) (35.93)
Number of Observations 44 18 32 16 44 18 32 16
"Constraint on the Executive in 1970" is constraint on executive in 1970 from the Polity dataset.  In all panels we instrument for institutions using log settler mortality (where mortality is 
per 1000 with replacement).  The Excolonies Sample includes all former colonies of European Powers for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) report data.  The alternative 
sample is excolonies above median world income in 1970, using the Summers-Heston estimates from Barro and Lee (1993), and without Gabon.  For more detailed data definitions and 
sources see Appendix Table 1.
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All Panels are cross-sectional regressions with one observation per country.  In all Panels the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita from 1970 to 1997, from the World Bank.  Log average inflation (in Panel A) is the log of average annual inflation in the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1997, from 
the World Bank.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, log average inflation is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., log average inflation over 1960-69).  
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for institutions
Macro and Institutions; 
instrumenting for both 
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variable is Government Consumption
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variable is Log Average Inflation
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variable is Overvaluation of Real Exchange Rate
Cross-section, 1970-1997, without controlling for initial 
income
Cross-section, 1970-1997, controlling for initial 
income
Dependent Variable is average annual growth of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1997
Government Consumption (Panel B) is the average of the ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure to real GDP from 1970 to 1989, from Barro-Lee.  In columns 5, 6, 9 and 10, 
government consumption is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., government consumption 1960-69 for government consumption 1970-89).  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (Panel 
C) is an index of real overvaluation of the official exchange rate during 1960-98, constructed by Easterly and Levine (2002) using the methodology of Dollar (1992).  In columns 5, 6, 9 
and 10, the real exchange rate overvaluation measure is instrumented using its lagged value (i.e., real overvaluation 1960-69 for real overvaluation 1970-98).  Log initial GDP per capita is 
the Summers Heston estimate for 1970, from Barro and Lee (1993).
Institutions only
Cross-section, 1970-1997Figure 1A
Standard deviation of growth rate, 1970-97, 


















































































































Worst output drop, 1970-97, 





































































































GDP per capita growth rate, 1970-97, 






























































































































































































































































Log Average Inflation, 1970-98






































































































Average Real Overvaluation, 1960-97


























































































































































































Log Average Inflation, 1970-98



































































































Average Real Overvaluation, 1960-97



































































































































































































Log Average Inflation, 1970-98




































































































Average Real Overvaluation, 1960-97































































Average constraint on executive (1950, 1960, 
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